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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis will attempted to analyse the Responsibility to Protect, whether the doctrine has a 
future in the workings of the international system as an effective mechanism for conflict 
resolution and for consensus on issues that surround violations of life, liberty and security of 
person. The R2P is acknowledged as a very new doctrine, the that has its fair share of warranted 
criticism and a long way to go before it becomes customary law in the international system. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, the thesis 
aimed to highlight the potential of the R2P in addressing modern conflict situations and 
providing long standing stability through committed assistance in capacity development. Despite 
failures in the RAMSI intervention, and the relatively small scale nature, it stands as a significant 
success in implementation of the R2P and exemplifies the doctrine‟s potential in application. At 
its base the R2P demonstrates a powerful normative shift towards the protection of the 
fundamental human rights of all people, and a shift away from traditional understandings of 
sovereignty as absolute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person (A3, UDHR) 
 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is arguably the most significant normative shift of the new 
millennium, and represents an extremely important aspect of modern society. It places 
fundamental human rights above state sovereignty and as such is a reminder of the essence of 
humanity and our solidarity as a race. For most of the modern era we have understood 
sovereignty as an institutional right - the right to political autonomy and territorial integrity. Yet 
as history has shown and the present day continues to provide examples, sovereignty as right 
proved often as power to those who seek to abuse it. Dictatorships like that of Mugabe, Pinochet, 
Gaddafi, and unstable, ideologically driven, political environments like that of Rwanda, the 
Sudan, and former Yugoslavia have highlighted the perils of unrestricted sovereign power. As 
such, the R2P has sought to change the language of sovereignty from that of right, to that of 
responsibility - emphasising the responsibility that comes with sovereign rights. The authors of 
the original report on the matter, and the international community at large have agreed that States 
have the responsibility to protect their citizens from harm, the responsibility to uphold all civil, 
political, economic and social rights and to strive to maintain peace and provide human security.  
The R2P articulates the need for all states to uphold and embody this notion of sovereignty in 
both a local and global sense, with the international community required to act in aid of countries 
that are unable to protect their citizens, and to intervene in instances where they are unwilling.  
The R2P is a movement aimed at ridding the world of the terrors and tragedies that occur and 
threaten humanity, as was the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Through the framework 
created, the international community may act if a State is found to be abusing its power and/or 
unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. The international community under the jurisdiction of 
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the UN is a collective body, existing to face the challenges of the modern era, maintain order and 
to fight for humanity. However, as history has shown, the functioning of this mechanism for 
conflict resolution gets caught up in political loyalties, power struggles, and specific foreign 
policy concerns of states – especially those with the power of veto, the P5 of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). Observing the world in 2011, the Arab Spring has brought with it considerable 
shifts toward more democratic nations, yet has also brought to the surface cases where the R2P 
should theoretically apply. Such cases as Libya and Syria have shown states that are unwilling to 
protect their citizens, yet there is considerable contention over whether the R2P can justify 
intervention. 
The R2P is still a very new concept and as yet has not received the status of customary law 
which would cement its principles in the fabric of the international community, and the 
functioning of global conflict resolution. Customary laws are those rules which consist of State 
practice over time and that are considered as legally binding on all States. Such status and 
compliance to the norms that the doctrine espouses would enable a more effective mechanism to 
provide aid assistance to nations experiencing internal conflict, and above all to protect the 
human rights of civilians in situations where the state is manifestly unwilling or unable to protect 
them. To reach its full potential (if ever it will) or to work out the kinks that prevent its 
application to conflict situations and the abuse of the right to life, liberty and security of person 
across the globe. Many of the problems that plague the doctrine such as scope, operationality, 
political will, sovereignty, right authority will remain for some time and may restrain the 
potential, both normative and actual, of the R2P. If the doctrine is to gain weight, and someday 
become part of the customary laws which are the guidelines for states, then thorough sustained 
analysis of its application needs to be made so that these problems may be remedied to allow the 
doctrine‟s momentum to build. Without collective will from international authorities to apply the 
principles of the doctrine and enforce the responsibility to protect without discrimination and 
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inconsistency, and without successes to give it weight, little progress will be made with 
contemporary humanitarian intervention and in protecting the human rights of all. A crucial 
aspect of the R2P is that it reinforces, rather than undermines sovereignty. It aims to assist states 
in upholding their duty to protect their citizens and direct the country in an effective and 
sustainable way. The R2P works with sovereignty, not against it.  
There are several cases today that invoke the R2P. The International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect lists these as Darfur, the Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma, Cote D‟Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Kenya, Guinea, and Kyrgyzstan. 
Each of these cases demands consideration of the costs, magnitude and feasibility of 
intervention, geographical considerations, political commitment as well as consideration of 
whether intervention is warranted due to the abuse of sovereignty, or to a states inability to 
uphold its sovereign responsibilities.  This particular contribution to R2P seeks to apply the 
concepts of the doctrine to a particular case of humanitarian intervention that has embodied 
many of its core principles and which therefore provides an example of success. The Regional 
Australian Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been in operation since 2003 when ethnic 
violence and civil unrest necessitated a sanctioned intervention. Over its eight years of operation 
it has maintained peace with the exception of a three day period in 2006 when violence again 
broke out, mostly directed toward businesses run by Chinese immigrants and fuelled by the 
political manipulation of large peri-urban settlement populations. RAMSI is involved in 
improving economic conditions in Solomon Islands, in the development of a sound and robust 
legal system and in instituting a transparent political system. The intervention highlights the 
three central aspects of the R2P – react, rebuild, prevent – where prevention goes hand in hand 
with rebuilding. Providing long term, committed assistance to building a sustainable, stable, 
functioning state, and peaceful conditions is a process by which prevention of future atrocities 
can occur. RAMSI endures in the Solomon Islands in a primarily capacity development role and 
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in order to prevent a relapse into the civil unrest and violence which would undermine the whole 
country. 
RAMSI is a decidedly small case study, in its scope, geopolitical significance and scale of 
investment required which is far less than in other cases where R2P is needed, yet it still exists 
within R2P parameters and gives weight to the doctrine. The central issues and events which 
sparked the intervention surrounded long standing ethnic tensions between the Malaitan and 
Guadalcanal people and as the R2P relates specifically to four categories (ethnic violence, 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) it is mandated in this situation. RAMSI also 
highlights several important elements of pillar two of the R2P that is international assistance to 
help states manifestly unable to protect their citizens. Understanding RAMSI can highlight the 
prevention element of the R2P as well as identifying a need to fill the middle ground between 
intervention and action.  
Methodology 
This particular contribution to the R2P seeks to understand the successes and failures of the R2P 
and its current standing in the international system through its potential in addressing modern 
conflict situations and providing long standing stability through committed assistance capacity 
development. To achieve this, the paper will first look at the themes and concepts of R2P, the 
various analyses made as to the feasible aspects of the doctrine, as well as an examination of the 
issues that confront the R2P and whether they delegitimize the doctrine or may be overcome 
with lessons drawn from current interventions under the R2P logic such as the primary case 
study of this project highlights. The second chapter will examine the theory behind the 
Responsibility to Protect, the rationale of the doctrine, the normative changes it proposes and the 
potential it holds for future efforts at the universal protection of basic human rights taken away 
in conflict situations. This chapter also discusses the concept of humanitarian intervention, its 
11 
 
modern day form and the nature of RAMSI as humanitarian intervention. The third chapter 
delves deeper into the Solomon Islands case with a discussion of history, political climate and 
the nature of the tensions that led to intervention – why was R2P warranted and what was done 
to implement it? The chapter also analyses the motivations of intervening countries. The fourth 
chapter analyses that „rebuild and prevent‟ elements of R2P and presents the bulk of information 
gathered from interviews conducted in Solomon Islands with RAMSI personnel and local 
Solomon Island politicians. Through this, the way RAMSI embodies the R2P is illuminated, and 
the lessons that can be taken from this particularly relevant example are presented.  
As mentioned, part of this project, interviews were conducted with RAMSI personnel and local 
Solomon Island politicians on site in Solomon Islands. The perceptions of participants and the 
information gained from these interviews are integrated throughout this thesis and add were 
crucial to understanding the case study and the ways in which it embodies the R2P. Other 
primary documents used include a select few articles from the Solomon Star used in analysis of 
the conflict, key United Nations Reports that provide the theoretical and conceptual base for the 
R2P, and news articles following current conflicts to which R2P applies. 
The R2P is part of a broader trend in world politics that is placing primacy on human rights, 
rather than state rights, and a movement that seeks to ensure states uphold their responsibilities 
through an international framework that mandates that they do, and provides a mechanism by 
which the international community can provide timely assistance if they do not. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Themes, Concepts and Challenges of the R2P 
SECTION 1: Conceptual Framework 
The Responsibility to Protect is a promising new concept in contemporary peace and security, 
reaffirming sovereign responsibility and the responsibility of the international community to 
ensure the protection of fundamental human rights. The doctrine emerged from the UN World 
Summit 2005 as a new and progressive discourse on humanitarian intervention and was 
unanimously endorsed. It has redefined and challenged the traditional concept of sovereignty and 
places a greater focus on notions of human security as essential in the prevention of atrocities 
occurring. The conceptual base of the doctrine is therefore inclusive of political as well as social 
and economic issues. The body of literature that surrounds the Responsibility to Protect is both 
extensive and varied, and is often dependent on the particular camp one identifies with. The 
discourse surrounding the R2P has focussed on the perceived challenges to State sovereignty that 
it implies, as well as its potential as an emerging norm in regards to human rights – protecting 
the right to life, liberty, and security of person.  
The doctrine emerged from the international arena, through various UN reports commissioned 
which provide the basis for the extensive analysis the concept has received. In 2001, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) handed down its 
seminal report entitled „A Responsibility to Protect‟, which built on the African Union‟s efforts 
to move from “non‐interference” into “non‐indifference”. This shifted the ongoing debate 
concerning humanitarian intervention from discussions of the right of powerful states to 
intervene, to the right of vulnerable communities to be protected from international crimes. The 
Commission focused on the responsibility of states to protect their own populations, and noted 
that when States were either unable or unwilling to protect their own people then the 
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international community had a responsibility rather than merely the right to do so (Evans & 
Sahnoun, 2001).   
 
The UN report „A More Secure World‟ builds on this and is an essential theoretical document 
prefaced by the notion that today‟s world is vastly different from that of 1945 when the 
organisation was founded and core documents composed. The report discusses the widely 
observed phenomena of global interconnectedness and argues that it defines the necessity of 
shared responsibility. The report makes the connection between development and security which 
provides the logic for preventative action and long term engagement, a core concept of the R2P. 
Threats to both state and human security are complex and variable, yet mutual vulnerabilities 
necessitate a supranational body to coordinate and act in cases of grave human rights violations. 
This notion comes into conflict with the traditional understanding of sovereignty as absolute 
territorial integrity and political autonomy, yet is not an attack on the concept itself. Rather the 
R2P seeks to provide a mechanism to encourage states to uphold their sovereign responsibilities 
to protect their citizens, and one through which the international community can act to help a 
state uphold these if it is unable or unwilling to do so. 
Tenants of the R2P 
For logistical and practical reasons, the responsibility to protect was defined as relating to four 
crimes of sufficient severity. These are genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. It is feared that if the R2P is expanded beyond this that it would lose any logistic 
viability, its potential for operationality, and political palatability. At the conclusion of the World 
Summit in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) stated that each member of the 
international community has the responsibility to protect their citizens against the threat of grave 
human rights violations   (Resolution 60/1). Further, the UNGA (2005: 31) stated that members 
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have the „responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means‟ to 
do this, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The principles of the R2P, affirmed by all member states at the 2005 World Summit, are 
threefold. 
1) Each State has the responsibility to protect its citizens from the threat of violent conflict 
2) The international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and peaceful means to help States realise their responsibility  
3) In cases of grave human rights violations, the international community must act in a 
timely and decisive manner to ameliorate suffering 
The ICISS added to these principles in its report, stating that the R2P comprises three main 
responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to rebuild. Bellamy (2008) has argued that where there 
has been significant attention given to the „react‟ and „rebuild‟ components, little has been paid 
to the responsibility to „prevent‟. He (Bellamy, 2008:135) makes the argument that prevention of 
deadly conflict is one of the fundamental goals of the UN, enshrined in the UN Charter which 
states the organisations central purpose as „saving future generations from the scourge of war‟. 
Pre-emptive prevention at present is a goal that involves considerable political risk, logistical 
difficulties as well as issues in legitimisation. The element of prevention is not refined to pre-
crisis situations, but also to post when action by the international community has been taken, and 
the rebuilding of structures and institutions of the state is taking place. This does however 
involve significant cost, time and significant resources of the intervening countries and can be a 
significant deterrent. Noting these, multilateral interventions where costs are diffused can aid in 
the development of missions that can work to provide the capacities needed for long term 
progress and stability that is a crucial part of preventing a repeat of the atrocities that sparked 
intervention or any other form of assistance in the first place. In this sense, long term 
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commitment is a definitive aspect of the R2P and contemporary humanitarian intervention, and 
is explored through the in-depth analysis of the Solomon Islands case study in chapters three and 
four of this thesis.  
Sovereignty and State Responsibility  
Perhaps the most contested aspect of the R2P is the perceived attack it makes on the sanctity of 
sovereignty. The R2P conceives of sovereignty as conditional, as involving responsibilities of 
each State to its citizens, yet the doctrine does not impede on sovereignty, States „raison d‟être‟, 
rather it reinforces it. It does so through emphasis on the international community‟s 
responsibility to help provide struggling States with the capacity needed to uphold their 
sovereign responsibilities. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (2008) has stated that the R2P 
strengthens and reinforces sovereignty through affirmation of existing international laws. Rather 
than taking away from sovereignty, the R2P highlights its core principles as enshrined in the 
Charters of the United Nations. 
The responsibility of the international community to assist states to uphold their sovereign 
responsibilities is a core element of the doctrine. This second pillar of the R2P is in line with 
Bull‟s seminal theory of a „society of states‟ which articulates the notion of collective action for 
mutual benefits. Bull (1977) has argued that a society of states is apparent:  
„when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with each other, and share in the working of common institutions‟ 
By this logic, the international community is not only a system but a society of states with shared 
responsibilities for social order and the maintenance of collective security. The R2P is an 
extension of this necessity and thus has the potential to be incorporated into existing customary 
law in a meaningful and effective way. In the same vein, Luck (2010: 352) has written that the 
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„ultimate goal is for states, societies, and people to internalize its (the R2P) principles into their 
conceptions of the nature of the state and its obligations to the populations within its territory‟. 
Therefore, whilst there is much support for the traditional notion of sovereignty, there is also 
significant support for the redefinition of the concept in terms of responsibility. The R2P shifts 
focus from the State to the individual, and through its second pillar it affirms Bull‟s notion of a 
society of states, of the international community as a collective ensured with the responsibility to 
hold each member to their duty to the individual. This conceptual shift, a shift from sovereign 
rights to human rights is an important normative change that the R2P makes. A central issue with 
the mechanism that pillar two provides is that it can be abused by states with unsavoury 
motivations for intervention, motivations that are not in line with the R2P. This issue is discussed 
in greater detail in the next chapter.  
R2P Normative Framework 
There are people in the world who live in constant fear of their homes being burnt down in the 
night, people who live in countries without a functioning state and the basic protections that one 
such would provide. In such countries the escalation of conflict can be rapid and unrelenting. 
This is not a new circumstance - it is one that the international community has tried to remedy 
with the creation of frameworks for collective humanitarian action. Such lessons that have been 
learnt from Rwanda, from Srebrenica, may have resulted in fervent pledges to prevent these from 
ever happening again yet Darfur is still raging on, Libya and Syria are the midst of turmoil, East 
Congo has been suffering for years and still there seems to be no mechanism to stop the conflicts 
that plague these nations, to stop the grave human rights abuses from occurring, for whatever 
reason they are. 
State authority, protection of sovereignty, and political risk assessment overpower many attempts 
to prioritise protection of human life of those outside of the power circles within which decisions 
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are made. For the world to reach a place where a majority can say that they do not have fears for 
their security, and have access to basic human rights such as health and education, and for the 
there needs to be a normative agenda underpinning the international community that prioritises 
the protection of life over unilateral national interests that often determine the political risks of 
intervention too high. As Kofi Anan stated, the international community must be able to respond 
quickly to „gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity‟ (as cited in Evans, 2004: 70). 
The Responsibility to Protect is an effort to further this end.  
„The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect concept challenges the theoretical conception of 
state authority as a given about which questions cannot be raised within the legal discipline. It 
also challenges the formal commitment to sovereign equality, self-determination and non-
intervention as foundational principles of the UN Charter. In grounding the authority of the state 
and the international community on the capacity to protect, the concept represents a significant 
shift in thinking about the lawfulness of authority in the modern world....as a result, the 
articulation and embrace of the responsibility to protect concept represents one of the most 
significant normative shifts in international relations since the creation of the UN in 1945.‟ 
(Orford, 2011: 41) 
Case Study: Solomon Islands 
To improve the standing of the R2P as an international norm, to give it weight and allow it to 
progress to higher standing in the international legal order so that it may have broader 
applicability, the doctrine needs to be applied to relevant settings of appropriate size and scale. 
The Asia-Pacific region provides an interesting and relevant context to apply the R2P, and the 
Solomon Islands case is the most compelling, with the eight year presence of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). It is however, a small size case study, and an 
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example of a situation in which a state was unable to protect its citizens from the violence that 
resulted from the breakdown in law and order. The conclusions drawn therefore will not inform 
every aspect of R2P intervention, as many cases are defined by states that are unwilling to 
uphold their sovereign responsibilities.  
 
The case satisfied the criteria of the R2P, and with the request for assistance by the Solomon 
Islands government, intervention was legitimised.  The mission also reflects the changing nature 
of international security post 9/11 as the dominant power in the region, Australia, went through a 
dramatic shift in foreign policy and its perceived place in the world (Wainwright, 2003). In this 
way the case also provides for an analysis of the motivations of the key contributor, and a 
platform to decipher how it differs from cases in which the motivations of contributing countries 
are questionable and thus interventions illegitimate.  
 
The case has the potential to strengthen the viability of the R2P through not only the operational 
lessons learned, but also the translation of concept into reality, and the regional structure and 
interests that facilitated successful deployment of RAMSI. As has been noted, the Solomon 
Islands is small in scale and size compared to that of other countries that may require 
international assistance in responsibility to protect. This will limit the ability to generalise all 
lessons learned, but will not detract from a significant contribution to the progression of the R2P 
as it demonstrates a successful case which can be built upon to ensure that the doctrine gains 
momentum. 
 
 In the broader Asia-Pacific context, Bellamy and Davies (2009) have reported that only 2 
countries in the region oppose R2P out of hand, far less than suggested by the prevalence of 
traditional concepts of sovereignty in the region. The potential for regional organisations to have 
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a major impact on conflict prevention through aiding in the provision of human security is 
exemplified by such successful organisations as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) whose projects and actions, 
among other organisations, contributed to a collective decline in global incidence of violent 
conflict according to the Human Security Report (2005). Overall, the case has the basic elements 
necessary to analyse the R2P in practice and its potential for future progression. The R2P is an 
evolving discourse and has room to grow, yet the reconciliation of R2P with the concept of non-
interference must occur before it can truly take hold as both a global norm and element of 
customary law.  
 
SECTION 2 - Challenges to the Responsibility to Protect 
There are several criticisms levelled at the R2P. These regard the perceived attack on 
sovereignty, the potential for abuse of the doctrine, and questions of international authority – 
who decides? There are also issues identified with the doctrine‟s operationality, scope, threshold 
for intervention and its inconsistent application. Attention must be paid to these arguments in 
consideration of how the doctrine can progress to a form that may be applied more effectively 
and to a broader cohort of international conflict situations. 
 
Territorial Integrity and Political Autonomy 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter states that „the Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its members‟. This original codification of sovereignty is drawn upon by 
those who argue that intervention under any circumstances is unlawful. Arguments along this 
line tend to point out that the R2P doctrine could be used by the powerful and the ambitious to 
further a program of neo-colonialism. Intervening nations are often accused of unsavoury 
economic motivations, and most of the time there has been some truth to them. Even if there 
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were humanitarian reasons for intervening in a struggling nation, there would undoubtedly be 
economic gains to be made, most of the time from natural resource extraction. The multinational 
nature of any intervention under the R2P and the focus on strengthening sovereign capacities 
displays a movement away from the trappings of past humanitarian interventions, and can allow 
for more transparent undertaking of the protection of „life, liberty, and security‟ of all people 
(A3, UDHR). 
 
Legal Viability 
Another issue with the R2P regards its status as „soft law‟, along with most of the other non-
binding international laws. The hope is that the R2P will be embraced as customary law, yet at 
present it stands only as an emerging norm, experiencing significant growing pains. It has been 
endorsed by the UNGA (2005) and reaffirmed by two Security Council Resolutions (1674 and 
1706) in 2006, yet ratification and implementation of such a normative change will take more 
than 6 years to come into fruition, if ever it will. It may be doomed to never gain sufficient 
legitimacy as was the fate of the Abolition of War doctrine. The R2P is said to strengthen 
sovereignty because it requires the international community to help states uphold their sovereign 
responsibilities. This is however still subject to interpretation and political considerations. Some 
might look to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prohibits intervention in matters which are 
within the jurisdiction of the problem state, to justify their opposition to humanitarian 
intervention, while others may call upon the language elsewhere in the Charter and in documents 
like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which codifies protection of the rights 
of the individual, not the state. 
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The Threshold and International Authority 
A central issue that has plagued past interventions is the issue of numbers, what is the threshold 
for intervention? Who decides? Who has the authority to decide when enough people have died 
to warrant international intervention? The R2P applies to only the crimes of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Who decides when this is occurring and 
whether intervention is necessary? 
As B.J. Bjornson of the Lowy institute recently wrote:  
„How many thousands of civilians being in danger of massacre would be enough? If you 
believed that it actually was hundreds of thousands, would you then have supported the 
intervention? Tens of thousands? Just a few hundred? ... Are there any circumstances where you 
would call for the US and other nations to step in and try to prevent the worst from happening?‟ 
The ICISS report on the R2P confirms the UN Security Council as the right authority in 
international conflict resolution, but what happens when the Security Council fails to act as it has 
in the past?  The „Uniting for Peace‟ mechanism is the logical solution, yet it too relies on 
consensus of a majority of UN member states which is difficult to reach, especially if there is 
opposition from any of the P5. So again, the implementation mechanisms by which the R2P is 
bound, often relegates the concept to paper only.  
 
Inconsistent Application 
Another problematic element of the R2P is its current inconsistent and selective application. At 
the crux of this issue is the aforementioned difference between States that are unable to protect 
their citizens, and those that are unwilling to do so. In the latter cases, conducting a humanitarian 
intervention becomes much more difficult as the abuse of sovereignty is not recognised by the 
State in question, and often not by those whose political loyalties lie with that State. Such cases 
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as these have highlighted the fact that despite clear indications that the R2P applies in many 
cases, no concerted international effort will be made because of the dangers to the sanctity of 
sovereignty and order of the international system that it entails. 
 
For example, there has been much talk about the application of the R2P in Syria where civilians 
have fallen victim to abuse by the State. The Syrian government has been delegitimized by the 
use of violence on its citizens but it maintains control over the use of force. Conversely, in Libya 
a successful NATO mission was launched after majority consensus on the imminence of attack 
on civilians by the now toppled regime (UNSC Resolution 1970, 1973). Why Libya and not 
Syria? The lack of consistency here has led to recent commentary that accuses the international 
community of using the R2P for regime change rather than civilian protection, that the R2P is a 
tool used only in ad hoc responses to violent conflict (Western, 2011). 
 
Also, despite relative success in application of the R2P in Libya for the protection of civilians, 
particularly in Benghazi and Misrata, there are complexities in such a situation that challenge the 
application of the R2P. Where pro-Gaddafi government forces have launched indiscriminate 
attacks on civilian populated areas such as Mistrata, and committed several other violations of 
the international laws of war, rebel forces have also to answer such charges as looting, arson, and 
some beatings of civilians (ICRtoP, 2011). Many civilians have been killed in the conflict, as 
well as in efforts by NATO. Civilians have been in need of protection from both sides of the 
conflict, and in the fragile stages post conflict, assistance in rebuilding lives, homes and in 
starting the reconciliation process for crimes committed will be needed. Yet humanitarian 
assistance to the scale needed will be impossible in the current political environment. The 
complex nature of such a mission, costs involved, the „invasion‟ connotations that would be 
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involved in the region, and the fact that the rebels have asked for military assistance and not 
intervention, add to the difficulties in applying the R2P long term for rebuilding and prevention. 
Political Will and Questions of Scope and Resource 
A lack of collective political will to further the R2P, to work out its kinks and give the doctrine 
weight in the international system is also a significant issue. As Benjamin (2009: 39) noted, the 
UN Assembly did not create clear guidelines for the enforcement of R2P, only going so far as to 
commit to „continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity‟. Therefore, Benjamin‟s conclusion 
that the R2P is a tenuous principle far removed from the norm of sovereign inviolability is 
troubling for the future of the doctrine (2009: 39). 
Even if it were decided by the UNSC, or a majority of UN member states, the character of a 
humanitarian mission under the R2P highlights another issue involved - scope of intervention. It 
is simply not enough to re-establish security, as Hynd (2011) points out a glaring hole in current 
R2P logic on the scope of intervention – that is the fact that the considerable resources required 
to intervene, resources which many countries are without after the global financial crisis. The 
resources needed to sustain the inevitable long term nature of an R2P mission are considerable 
and as noted by Benjamin (2009: 42), many of the contributors to contemporary UN 
peacekeeping missions are from developing countries that do not have the infrastructure 
necessary to build troop competence. Long term humanitarian involvement in a conflict nation is 
especially questionable when it involves the use of violence to stop violence, and when these 
resources could be put to better use. Hynd (2011) also questions the lack of R2P application to 
other humanitarian disasters such as the current famine in the horn of Africa, where mass loss of 
life is occurring.  
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Another issue in regards to legitimacy of R2P intervention is pointed out by Newman (2009: 
100) who argued that „the trend to separate R2P from a wider Human Security agenda is deeply 
regrettable. It simultaneously undermines the potential of the doctrine to counter the existing 
international political economy favoured by the global North, and means that many developing 
countries may simply regard it as a new slogan to justify military intervention against weaker 
and poorer states‟. Legitimising intervention under the R2P without a mandate for „rebuild and 
prevent‟ and a clear and justified goal focussed on protecting the fundamental human rights of 
populations that have these deprived of them, the viability of the R2P as an international norm 
and source of customary law will be all but impossible.  
The Very Real Potential for Abuse 
A final criticism levelled toward the R2P doctrine is the fact that it may be misused, as have 
humanitarian arguments in the past. R2P has the potential to be used to justify intervention under 
the language, the guise of human rights, yet in cases where the intervening nation/s stand to gain 
significantly  - economically, politically or otherwise. The most obvious example is the US‟ 
unilaterally motivated invasion of Iraq – „the axis of evil‟. This argument is in line with selective 
and inconsistent application of R2P as pointed out in many papers on the matter, and by one of 
the RAMSI officials interviewed as part of this project. This official suggested that the R2Ps 
internal legitimacy is questionable if it can only be applied to some of the many crises which 
have and may in the future involve the violation of fundamental human rights and atrocities of 
the nature of any of the four crimes which mandate the R2P (ethnic cleaning, war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity). Day and Freeman (2005: 140) also argued that the 
operationalisation of the R2P has been restrained by the dual deadlock of establishing a 
permanent international military capacity and well founded fears of non-consensual intervention 
that facilitate political exploitation. There is certainly potential for the misuse of R2P to 
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legitimize interventions that are defined by control, rather than protection of fundamental human 
rights. 
 
Noting these valid critiques, the R2P does not progress without significant challenges. These 
challenges cannot however detract entirely from the necessity of having such framework as R2P 
that allows for international, collective action to alleviate mass suffering.  As Kofi Annan stated 
in his 1999 address to the UN General Assembly:  
„Surely no legal principle -- not even sovereignty -- can ever shield crimes against humanity . . . 
Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, 
it is an option that cannot be relinquished‟ 
Is this testament enough to overcome the significant issues the R2P faces in regards to its 
legitimacy? The final chapter will analyse the responsibility to protect through the Solomon 
Islands case study and whether the humanitarian intervention that took place can shine light on 
this question and present an understanding of the parameters in which the doctrine can progress. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Theoretical Elements and International Law 
To understand the full force of the R2P, it is necessary to have an understanding of the legal and 
theoretical framework within which it exists and how these effect its real world application. This 
chapter will therefore discuss the nature of sovereignty as conditional, the parameters of 
humanitarian intervention, the language of prevention, the international human rights framework, 
and the ways in which these elements are reflected by RAMSI.  
The Sanctity of Sovereignty 
As the second pillar of the R2P states, the international community has the responsibility to 
intervene for humanitarian purposes when a State is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. 
When considering the operational form of the R2P and assessment of the consequences of each 
specific case where it may apply, the categorisation of whether the state is „unwilling‟ or unable‟ 
may be the difference between the ability of the international community to launch a 
humanitarian intervention legitimised by the R2P, and for it to merely be discussed and analysed 
in the abstract. When a State is unable to protect its citizens, as was the case in the Solomon 
Islands, the intervention is consented by the state as well as the people which attributes it a 
certain level of legitimacy. When a state is unwilling to protect its citizens and possibly 
perpetrating the abuse, the prospect of humanitarian intervention and the R2P becomes much 
more contested. The same criteria would apply but international consensus and the formation of 
an intervening force sanctioned by the UN hits considerable road blocks. These include the 
problem of international authority and the political loyalties that may stand in the way of 
consensus on whether the State in question is manifestly failing in its ability to protect its 
citizens. Tilly (1985: 171) argues that government provision of protection often qualifies as 
racketeering with the monopolisation of violence to further their own ends of the accumulation 
of power. The problem is that they may use this against their own citizens if they appear as 
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potential rivals, or allies of rebellious peoples such as the situation with the Gaddafi regime in 
Libya (Tilley, 1985: 174). 
The notion that the international community has the responsibility to launch an intervention if it 
happens that a State is manifestly failing in its responsibility to protect is contentious in that it 
challenges the absolute sanctity of sovereignty. By the same token it is progressive, as it provides 
a normative framework and a mechanism by which the international community can act as a 
society of states to ensure that every human being has the basic rights of life, liberty and security 
of person that are fundamental to existence. As aforementioned, the R2P does not undermine 
sovereignty, but rather reinforces it by placing emphasis on the responsibilities that it entails. 
The very fact that the R2P places emphasis on sovereign responsibility and thus deeming 
sovereign rights as conditional is a dramatic shift away from the traditional conceptual 
framework of international order and the norm of non-interference. It falls in line with the idea 
that sovereignty needs to be replaced by an understanding that the nation state is autonomous in 
specific spheres but responsible to higher levels of organisation in others (Rotblat, 1997: 7). The 
purpose of the State is to ensure the protection of its citizens, and thus the R2P is re-emphasising 
this through the framework of responsibility.  This shift has been a necessary one, as has been 
noted in previous sections, with too many examples of mass loss of life that the international 
community has been unable to alleviate, unable to protect the sanctity of life. The R2P, with its 
emphasis on protection of human rights through ensuring State responsibilities are upheld, has 
also allowed for a greater level of legitimacy in humanitarian intervention when a situation is 
sufficiently severe as to call for it. The concept of humanitarian intervention is central to the 
R2P, and is a long term commitment. 
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Humanitarian Intervention  
The conventional understanding of humanitarian intervention is coercive action against a State to 
protect citizens from harm (Abiew, 1999). Humanitarian intervention dominated the first post-
Cold War decade of the 1990s, from saving the Kurds in Northern Iraq to the failing state in 
Somalia, the tribal wars for control in Rwanda, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Humanitarian intervention and the R2P are not synonymous. However, the normative principles 
which inform both are in line. As Teson (as cited in Benjamin, 2009: 41) argued, when a state 
violates the human rights of its citizens, humanitarian intervention is warranted in both a moral 
and legal sense and the proportionate use of force involved supports the ultimate purpose of a 
State is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of its citizens. States are in the 
service of the people, and not the other way around. 
As Kofi Annan (2001) stated „to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity?‟ 
 The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international relations has long been a subject of 
controversy (Abiew, 1999: 5). This again comes back to the conflict between traditional realist 
notions of state interests and a more liberal view on the nature of cooperation in the international 
system and the priorities which define it. Humanitarian intervention cannot be legally justified 
within international laws as it violates the absolute nature of sovereignty, unless the P5 all agree 
to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This has only ever happened once (Korea), and relative 
consensus is unlikely to be reached again, thus in the current legal framework the notion of 
humanitarian intervention is flawed as it cannot be enforced. However, there has been a 
significant movement towards the universal protection of human rights and now the 
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responsibility to intervene when states are manifestly failing in their duty to protect the „life, 
liberty, and security‟ (A3, UDHR) of citizens. 
Legality of Humanitarian Intervention 
As Heinze (2009: 79-83) notes, UN member states are party to the UN Genocide Convention 
(1949), the Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Torture (1975), and a myriad of other 
international legal instruments that prohibit crimes against individuals and groups. The most 
important of these are those that hold weight as customary laws.  These are rules which consist 
of State practice over time and that are considered as legally binding.  The respect for 
sovereignty of each nation and the territorial integrity and political autonomy that this involves, 
has long been part of customary law of the international system, yet as has been noted before, the 
R2P‟s unanimous endorsement is a testament to the fact that sovereignty is not absolute and it is 
not right – it is responsibility. 
Further, Magnuson (2010: 3) states that a world that demands respect for human rights cannot 
coexist with a world that demands absolute respect for state sovereignty. As discussed 
previously, the mere fact that the entire UNGA endorsed the R2P is a testament to the ability of 
the international community to look beyond the absolute nature of sovereignty. The doctrine 
espouses that people should be protected under international law, not just states. 
Strict Criteria 
The ICISS‟s „Responsibility to Protect‟ document (2001) stated that humanitarian intervention 
must be in accordance with acknowledged precautionary principles: just cause, right intention, 
last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects. Accordingly, the international 
community has established this checklist that defines legitimate intervention on humanitarian 
terms and these must be satisfied for any such intervention to occur. 
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The report that followed this, submitted by the Secretary General‟s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Changes, emphasised the emerging norm. The panel members wrote that:  
„we endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, 
exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event 
of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent‟ 
(as cited in Magnuson 2010: 8). 
Evans (2004: 70) has argued that the R2P is a considered attempt to formulate set criteria for any 
intervention that involves military force and in this way the functioning of the UNSC can be 
vastly improved. He lists five specific criteria for legitimate intervention, in line with jus ad 
bellum, as 1) seriousness of threat; 2) proper purpose; 3) last resort; 4) proportional means; and 
5) balance of consequences. These along with the limitation of the R2P to the four specific 
crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing) ensure that the R2P is 
not doomed to fail because of lack of collective support, as it ensures that the doctrine does not 
apply to every country in the world that is experiencing some form of civil or ethnic conflict. 
This would simply be logistically impossible, and permanently unpalatable to many States that 
are already wary of a diminution of their sovereign authority. The five criteria maximise the 
possibility of achieving UNSC consensus and minimise the possibility of individual member 
States bypassing or ignoring the UNSC using the R2P as a „convenient rationalisation‟ of 
intervention (Evans, 2004: 78). It must be noted however, that there is a troubling relationship 
between humanitarian intervention and national interest as Chesterman (in Lang, 2003: 55) 
notes, with the potential for misuse of humanitarian intervention by states with unilateral 
interests as was discussed in the previous chapter.  
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UDHR  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is one of the most important pieces of 
international law, and is central to the normative proposals of the R2P. Although its 
universality is debated, it remains one of the most important normative documents in 
existence. Many of the articles are applicable to situations where human rights abuses are 
occurring, and where states are manifestly failing in their responsibilities to protect and 
provide for their citizens. The normative aspects that guide the R2P with its shift of focus to 
the protection of human rights is certainly in line with the rights codified in the UDHR and is a 
step further to ensuring that these come first when there is contention between the rights 
encoded there, and other aspects of international law. Many of the articles can be called upon 
when justifying the normative agenda that the R2P espouses – Article 13 regarding freedom of 
movement, Article 17 regarding the right to possessions, Article 25 and 26 regarding the basic 
rights to health and education, Article 30 prohibiting the abuse of the rights encoded in the 
UDHR. The list goes on.  
The R2P and the language of prevention 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood (Article 1, 
UDHR) 
Normative theory in international relations challenges conventional understandings of the 
international system and its workings. It broadly encompasses theories such as 
cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, and various anti-foundational approaches such as 
constructivism. These espouse an understanding of international ethics, moral inclusion, 
international and distributive justice, and often place a focus on the individual rather than the 
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state (Cochran, 1999). The R2P has a definitive normative proposal - it is changing the 
language of sovereignty to responsibility and as such is constructing a new normative 
framework with which the international system functions. It is hoped that the R2P can create 
this framework, with its principles the guidelines for state functioning and international efforts 
to combat conflict when civilians are at risk. Part of how the doctrine is doing this concerns 
constructivist theory which argues that humans gain knowledge and meaning from an 
interaction between knowledge and ideas. All truth is socially constructed in other words. The 
primacy of language, of how thoughts, ideas is argued to be central to the functioning of the 
international system and thus with the R2P articulating sovereignty as responsibility, 
prevention and all that this entails, a new normative framework may be constructed. The 
theory proposes that the formation of international relations, the elements that define the 
international system are historically contingent and thus the realities of the system have been 
constructed over time, through interaction, and can be moulded in this day and age.  
Further, R2P conforms to a broader human rights movement that has roots much earlier than 
2005, and is part of a broader trend of conflict management with strategies that include more 
targeted development aid to build state capacity, more comprehensive post conflict 
stabilisation, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts (Western, 2011). As Luck (2010) argues 
- political will can be built (or destroyed) over time, and as such the endorsement of the R2P in 
2005 reflected how much political, social, and security values had already changed and 
continue to change in the evolution of global politics. He observes that like the political paths 
of human rights and humanitarian affairs, the concept of human security has moved to the 
forefront of international attention and political priorities and is contributing to the re-
evaluation of traditional concepts (Luck, 2010).  
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This thesis challenges the notion that states may only rely on their own capacities for security. 
That the anarchic nature of the international system demands, or compels them to constantly 
act in their own self interest. This is not to say that protecting national security, economic and 
political stability should be forgotten, but this task and the reality of states cooperating to 
ensure international peace and security, to ensure the universal protection of human rights, are 
not exclusive. To believe that every player in the international system would desire this goal is 
a naive understanding. However it is not naive to state that a majority would prefer a world 
where consensus in issues of global peace and human security, the protection of fundamental 
human rights of every person, could be achieved and cooperation for long term preservation of 
life and freedoms be the defining norm of the international system. 
Hedley Bull‟s society of states fits this logic, is a good articulation of these concepts, of this 
attainable version of world politics. But in relation to the R2P, articulation of the a central goal 
of the responsibility to protect as „prevention‟ and focussing on the protection of human rights, 
thus changing the unit of analysis from the state to the human being, is a crucial articulation. 
Prevention furthers the goal of avoiding the contentious use of military force. As has been 
noted however, pre-emptive prevention involves significant challenges in terms of legitimising 
any sort of intervention under the R2P in its fragile state. This may become possible if the 
doctrine is able to progress as a norm. However prevention not only applies pre conflict, but 
post conflict in situations like the Solomon Islands where a long term commitment is necessary 
in preventing a recurrence of the ethnic violence and great instability that spurred the initial 
intervention.  
Along these lines, a final argument which underpins the theoretical basis for the long term 
preventative nature of intervention to uphold the responsibility to protect regards the necessity 
of human development. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingmann (2003: 344) argued that 
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socioeconomic development; rising emancipative values and democratisation constitute a 
coherent syndrome of social progress. The capacity development programs that are involved in 
such a mission as RAMSI exemplifies, further the goal of enabling these elements that cement 
sustainable development and stability for a developing nation and its people. The central 
argument is that: 
„the syndrome of human development op by a operates across nations, regions and cultural 
zones...(it) is shaped by a process in which socioeconomic development and rising 
emancipative mass values lead to rising levels of effective democracy and the effect of 
emancipative values on effective democracy operates through their impact on elite integrity. 
Indeed elite integrity is the factor that makes formal democracy effective‟ (Welzel et al, 2003: 
344). 
Human development is a definitive element of national progress, long term peace and stability. 
The R2P mandates states to ensure the conditions for human development, and if they fail to 
do so, it is the responsibility of the international community to act in a timely and decisive 
manner to restore or create such enabling conditions. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention, the R2P and RAMSI 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands was an intervening force, but one which 
was invited in by the government of the day and mandated to return security and economic 
stability to a nation plagued by waring militia and unfettered criminals. Therefore under the 
conventional understanding, RAMSI was not purely a „humanitarian intervention‟, however 
the core of the concept is the protection of civilian population from threats unanswered by the 
state, and so RAMSI can be understood as primarily humanitarian in nature. One of the central 
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issues of past humanitarian interventions was the use of military force against a state. In the 
first stages of RAMSI, an active military presence was needed to re-establish a secure 
environment and carry out the mass disarmament of the rebel militias. Subsequently, the 
military has taken a back seat, and now functions as a third tier of security, only called upon in 
emergency situations like the 2006 riots or extensive security operations as were put in place to 
ensure no repetition of such violence in the 2010 general elections. 
The point here is that RAMSI is a humanitarian mission. A mission that answered a threat to 
the life, liberty and security of the Solomon Islands people and one which has remained in the 
country to aid in the process of re-building the state to ensure that this basic human right is not 
taken away from the Solomon Islands people again, as it was during the „Tensions‟ period 
(1998-2003). 
Strengthening sovereignty through aiding the responsibilities that it entails to be upheld by 
State authorities is a core principle of the R2P. Abiew (1999) argues, as does this paper, that 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are not incompatible. The Responsibility to Protect 
also presents this logic - the world through this lens observes a cosmopolitan situation of 
global partnership and assistance for development and security. Under the new framework, the 
decision to intervene is made from the point of view of those needing support and not those 
providing it. Provision of protection carries a broader meaning than intervention; implying not 
just an obligation to react, but also equally important and parallel obligations to prevent and 
rebuild Acharya (2002: 734). 
Following this logic, the central message of this year‟s World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2011) is twofold: 
 
36 
 
1. Some 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and 
criminal violence – causing human misery and disrupting development 
2. To break these cycles, it is crucial to strengthen legitimate national institutions and 
governance in order to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs – as well as alleviating 
the international stresses that increase the risks of violent conflict 
 
Observing RAMSI‟s pillars and associated programs are in line with the logic espoused by the 
World Bank‟s report. Clearly the Solomon Islands is an entirely different case to somewhere like 
Libya, like Syria whose specific issues and geographical context call make any intervention 
under R2P much more complex and difficult to legitimise. This does not suggest however that 
R2P will never be able to manifest in a transparent, physical form in such nations, rather that 
there is certainly no one size fits all form of the R2P to counter the repeated cycles of political 
and criminal violence. This is especially true considering the central element of the R2P that 
makes it palatable – the doctrine reinforces, not detracts from sovereignty. What we can take 
from R2P in Solomon Islands is that successes can be had, changes made and the fundamental 
human rights of people protected in the face of failing sovereignty. 
 
Furthermore, the report acknowledges the downfalls of the current system of diplomatic, 
security, and development institutions that answer interstate conflict and civil wars. The repeated 
cycles of instability and in many of today‟s struggling nations are not well dealt in this 
framework and thus need the specifics of the R2P need to be integrated. Emphasis needs to be 
placed on focused assistance on confidence building, citizen security, justice and jobs; 
reformation of the procedures of international agencies to respond more swiftly; responding at 
the regional level; and renewal of the cooperative efforts between lower, middle, and higher 
income countries (World Bank, 2011). 
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This brings us back to one of the central arguments of this paper, that before any new doctrine 
such as the R2P can gain weight and legitimacy its application needs to be verified through 
successful interventions. These interventions must be consistent with the three pillars of the R2P 
and the specific criteria they mandate, must be legitimate in the eye of constituents by their 
nature as humanitarian (not invasion for economic gains), multinational in nature and deep 
enough with a long term commitment so as to truly provide the opportunity to develop a state‟s 
capacity to further the goal of prevention and underscore an international commitment to the 
protection of fundamental human rights. The following chapters present such a case. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Why R2P? State failure and ethnic violence in Solomon 
Islands 
Why assistance to the magnitude of intervention was called for in Solomon Islands? Why was 
there a need for the members of the Pacific Islands Forum to ensure the responsibility to protect 
in Solomon Islands and in what ways has RAMSI embodied the R2P? This chapter explores 
these issues as well as the motivations of the intervening nations with an analysis of the 
motivations of Australia, the dominant power in the Pacific Islands region and leader and chief 
funder of RAMSI. 
An unstable environment, an unable state – reasons for R2P 
In 2003 when RAMSI was formed and began its operation, the Solomon Islands was in a state of 
lawlessness and severe civil unrest resultant of economic hardship and ethnic tensions. Until 
1978 the Solomon Islands was a British colony. After gaining independence, charge of the 
country was left to an ill-prepared local political elite and the years that followed resulted in 
mismanagement, increasing corruption and deterioration of the economy. As Mayerson (2009: 
11) argued, this last factor combined with increasing migration of Malaitan peoples to 
Guadalcanal, home of the country‟s capital Honiara, was the catalyst to the civil conflict of 1998. 
Deep seated ethnic tensions between the Malaitan and Guadalcanal people produced the 
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army/Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) which in turn provoked the 
formation of the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and drove Solomon Islands into a situation of civil 
unrest, violence, and guerrilla warfare.  
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Political and Economic instability 
As a former British colony, Solomon Island‟s political system is based on the Westminster 
model with a parliament whose members elect the Prime Minister. This and the lack of well 
establish parties, makes it much more fluid than ones such as Australia, despite being based on 
the same fundamental principles. The resultant frequent votes of no confidence, reshuffling and 
firing of ministers and high level of corruption has systematically undermined the systems 
founding principles and led to the development of a weak parliamentary system (Moore, 2008). 
The institutions that define the modern state were developed during the colonial period, and very 
poorly at that. It is argued that after decolonisation in 1978 when power was placed in the hands 
of local officials, weaknesses crept into the system and a culture of corruption developed (Maine, 
2010).  Within a country where traditional subsistence lifestyles are led by the majority of the 
population and only 25% are in waged work, power is centralised in the hands of a few and 
dictated by short term economic gains that degrade natural resources and the long term viability 
of the economy. Leadership is driven by money and the system abounds in a lack of 
transparency, responsibility and accountability instead of efficient use of authority in state 
direction. As Roughan (2010) writes, 29% of funding is in the hands of provinces whereas 71% 
is controlled by the central government. This disproportionate distribution of power has led to 
the underdevelopment of rural areas in which 85% of the population live. With such power 
differentials even within the institutions of government, it is clear that short term economic gains 
outweigh those of long term growth of sustainable industries and an equitable distribution of 
resources or delivery of services in Solomon Islands. This is greatly exploited with the dollar 
diplomacy strategies of Asian nations, most prominently Taiwan, which results in regular 
siphoning off so called „constituency aid‟ to MPs. Dobell (as cited in Moore, 2008) has argued 
that, specifically, the dollar diplomacy of Taiwan allows the country to exert undue malevolent 
influence on the political process in Solomon Islands, especially in the case of logging where 
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timber exports account for 70% of all exports and 17% of all government revenue (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 26 October 2009). The benefits of corrupt actions such as these also serve to 
continue the practice by sitting members of parliament and thus compound a vicious cycle of the 
perpetual misuse of state power. With such an unstable political environment, the continuation of 
RAMSI in a capacity development function falls under the R2P mandate of prevention. 
The Governor of Solomon Island‟s Central Bank, Denton Rarawa, says that the practise of vote 
buying by most MPs in power leads to a situation where „the wrong kind of people come in – not 
because of their merit but because of their ability to buy votes and influence the outcomes of the 
election – when these kind of people come in, in most cases, they would, be interested in what 
they can get out of the system not what they can contribute to the system‟ (Coutts, 2010). He 
argues that a stable political environment would allow for sound and transparent economic 
decisions and a subsequent improvement in living standards for Solomon Island citizens. A 
significant lack of public engagement with the state in the past is cited as a contributing factor to 
the continued nature of corruption in successive governments (Ronia, 2010). 
Added to this unstable environment with a malfunctioning parliament, poor economic prospects 
and direction, and corrupt practices, is significant ethnic diversity and some deep seated tensions 
based on ethnic differences. At the start of the „Tensions‟ in 1998, the number of Malaitan 
migrants to Guadalcanal had reached significant proportions, and had created anger and 
resentment amongst the local Guale population based on land rights, economic opportunities and 
considerable cultural differences (Boyers et al, 2009). With careful and covert political 
manipulation these tensions were fanned in 1998-99, leading to terrible violence against 
Malaitan settlers in rural Guadalcanal, unable to be effectively dealt with by an under-resourced 
and highly compromised police force.  In the absence of any decisive action to address this issue 
or even recover the bodies of those killed the MEF was formed a coup removing the government 
of the day executed on 5 June 2000 (Boyers et al, 2009: 14). Many Solomon Islanders lost their 
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lives, their homes and their possessions during the period that spanned 1998-2003. The Solomon 
Island government was unable to protect its citizens from this violence and the collapse of the 
rule of law, the severity of the situation called for international assistance. The international 
community had a responsibility to protect. 
The deployment of a police led intervention 
RAMSI was launched in 2003 at the request of Sir Allan Kemakeza‟s government and pursuant 
to the Biketawa Declaration (In July 2000, following coups in two member states, Fiji and 
Solomon Islands, in May and June respectively, the annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Heads of 
Government meeting In Kiribati, endorsed a declaration (named after the island upon which they 
were meeting) establishing a framework for coordinating a regional response to member states in 
crisis (Boyers et al, 2009: 17). Under the Biketawa Declaration, the PIF acts as a mechanism for 
providing assistance to threatened states by consent of that state‟s government, therefore 
qualifying as a viable regional body with the authority to exercise pillar two of the R2P.  RAMSI 
is the first multinational regional mission in the Asia Pacific, with all members of The PIF 
involved. Prior to RAMSI, in October 2000, Australia had facilitated „peace talks‟ between the 
Guadalcanal and Malaitan militia, resulting in the Townsville Peace Agreement which included 
the establishment of an Australian led and funded, International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) 
to assess local efforts to monitor its implementation.. A Ceasefire Monitoring Council, chaired 
by Paul Tovua, was created, and maintained for a time. However the program was unsuccessful 
in stemming the violence and associated collapse of the state which continued, ultimately leading 
to the withdrawal of the woefully inadequate 20-member IPMT expected to implement the 
agreement (Boyers et al, 2009: 15). 
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Mission Structure 
As has been discussed in previous sections, the R2P mandates any mission legitimised under its 
normative framework be long-term and committed to rebuilding the enabling structures of the 
necessary for long term peace, stability, security and improvement of economic welfare. Each 
particular case of the R2P, each unique context has its own set of core issues, traditional or pre-
existing structures, geopolitical concerns that define the character of a humanitarian mission, not 
least amongst these the aforementioned difference between a state that is „unwilling‟ and a state 
that is „unable‟ to uphold its responsibilities to protect. RAMSI highlights the nature of two 
central elements of the R2P as envisioned by former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan – 
Rebuild and Prevent. Regional cooperation, partnership, restoration of peace and committed 
efforts at capacity development are all part of these processes and can be seen through the 
RAMSI‟s distinct mission structure. 
The first stage of the RAMSI mission was to restore law and order through the disarmament of 
militant groups, bring an end to criminal impunity.  RAMSI succeeded in this, with 733 people 
being arrested and 3700 weapons removed from circulation by the end of 2003. The second stage 
in which RAMSI continues is primarily as a capacity development mission. Mayerson (2009: 13) 
has outlined the six distinct projects involved in this as: 1) detailed specification of institutional 
problems in the Solomon Islands‟ law and justice system; 2) community-relationship building 
measures (winning hearts and minds); 3) identification, mentoring and coaching of key Royal 
Solomon Island Police Force (RSIPF) personnel; 4) identification of gaps between what the 
authorities ought to be able to accomplish in an effective and legitimate manner and what they 
could actually accomplish given present capacity; 5) establishment of transparent institutional 
processes; 6) development of a meaningful exit strategy. As such these are the goals assessed to 
be within the capacity of the regional assistance mission, considering numbers, resources, risks, 
costs. 
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Australia’s Motivations for Intervention – humanitarian? 
RAMSI is a mission led by Australia. Its formation highlighted a move to the next level of 
humanitarian assistance and was a significant departure from Australia‟s non-interference 
foreign policy in the region. The mission also demonstrates a movement toward regional 
cooperation for collective security, with all 15 members of the PIF contributing to the mission. 
This particular fact helped get the mission off the ground with a significant diffusion of costs. 
The past eight years has shown that Australia is committed to the long term mission along with 
the 14 other Pacific Island nations whose contributions reflect their capacities, and has shown 
considerable leadership as the dominant country in the region. As with any other multilateral 
intervention, intentions are questioned as to their humanitarian nature and whether a mission is 
pursuant to the UN Charter and human rights treaties.  
 A Decisive Policy Change 
A key document in analysis of this issue is „Our Failing Neighbour‟(Wainwright, 2003), the 
inaugural initiative of the newly established Australian Strategic Policy Institute (APSI), Our 
Failing Neighbour is touted as the document which pushed the Howard government into a new 
policy direction in the Pacific Islands and in particular in Solomon Islands. Prior to its 
publication and its eventual manifestation in the form of the RAMSI, a strict policy of non-
intervention was followed by successive Australian Governments who took bipartisan cue from 
the lessons learnt in Vietnam in the seventies. Aid was given to developing nations in the region, 
but with little forethought to the desired outcomes. Applied to the early years of the Bougainville 
crisis and the Solomon Islands Tensions, this policy in reality meant mass violence went 
unchecked by the international community, an arms trade proliferated and lawlessness was able 
to prevail, right on Australia‟s doorstep (Wainwright, 2003). The shift symbolised a move away 
from the absolute respect of sovereignty, to the primacy of human rights and security of 
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populations. As such, the shift brought Australian foreign policy, as far as Solomon Islands goes, 
in line with the normative agenda of the R2P.   
 
Only months prior to RAMSI landing in Solomon Islands, the then Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer said it would be a great „folly in the extreme‟ for Australia to intervene in Solomon 
Islands. Interviewee Mary Louise O‟Callaghan stated that „I don‟t think Solomon Islands rated 
much attention in Australia‟s foreign policy...generally they didn‟t start paying attention until it 
started collapsing‟ (10th August, 2011). 
There were many who prickled at the conclusion that Solomon Islands was a „failing state‟ in 
2003, yet the APSI document was to be the catalyst to the RAMSI intervention. The introductory 
chapter states that: 
 „Australia faces a new challenge: how to promote our interests in these island territories 
as they struggle to achieve viability as independent sovereign states in a tough world. 
Many of them are, to a greater or lesser degree, failing.‟ (ASPI, 2003) 
The report certainly had a significant impact in Canberra as within months RAMSI was deployed 
and a long-standing policy of non-intervention was left behind. The tone of the report would 
suggest that this was largely due to the potential threats to Australia‟s national security that 
might have arisen if Solomon Islands people were left to and to deal with the internal struggles. 
This is in contravention to the normative agenda that this paper puts forward through the R2P 
and to the theme that came through from all those interviewed. 
The document was written for Australian political audiences in a time when the „terrorist‟ threat 
was becoming very real in the eyes of world leaders, mostly as a consequence of 9/11 and the 
Bali Bombings of 2002. As Allen (2011: 4) wrote, the policy change was in line with „broader 
shifts in the international strategic environment following 9/11‟. The Bush administration had 
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launched the „war on terror‟ with invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and terrorism featured in 
most daily headlines. The intervention in Solomon Islands may have been driven in part by this 
new global security threat, yet it was also a decidedly humanitarian mission. Interviewee Mary 
Louise O‟Callaghan stated that Australian national security in the context of declining regional 
security was the primary motivation for intervention, yet that it did not supersede the 
humanitarian reasons for intervention (August 10
th
, 2011). Be the case in Canberra what it may, 
successive RAMSI Special Coordinators have perceived the mission as a defined by R2P 
principles, and these views are consistent with the views of a majority of interviewees. 
For example, Nick Warner, RAMSI‟s first Special Coordinator stated on the day of RAMSI‟s 
deployment that „people everywhere have a right to live their lives peacefully, to go about their 
daily business without threats or violence or intimidation, to have their children educated in 
schools, to have illness attended to in hospitals and clinics, to have a government that is 
permitted to govern for the benefit of all people, free from intimidation or coercion by armed 
thugs.‟ (2003). Warner goes on to confirm an essential element of the R2P - the intervening 
forces are in Solomon Islands to strengthen the sovereignty of SIG by aiding the development of 
infrastructure necessary for the SIG to be effective in upholding its sovereign responsibilities 
Special Coordinator Nicholas Coppel (2011) confirmed that RAMSI‟s role in Solomon Islands 
was to create a safe space, and now to aid the international dialogue on the R2P. 
It is the people on the ground, the people that have been with RAMSI and in Solomon Islands for 
its duration that are best placed to acknowledge the necessity and nature of intervention and its 
continuance. As Ms O‟Callaghan noted – “I had been arguing for an intervention saying „they 
are not going to be able to fix it up on their own, so it‟s not going to go away‟, and a) we have 
the responsibility as the most established nation in the region, to use the resources and expertise 
at our disposal to assist them to get out of this hole” (10th August 2011).  
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The central normative base that is espoused in these pages is that humanitarian intervention 
should occur for humanitarian reasons, as soon as a situation in which ethnic cleansing, 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, is identified. The people suffering in such a 
situation should not have to wait for there to be a threat to a country, or a region with resources 
to provide effective relief. In the Pacific Islands region, Australia has significant capacity to 
alleviate the suffering of such people as the hundreds of thousands of Solomon Islanders that 
were affected by five years of bloody conflict, of people fearing for their security, their lives, for 
any major action to be undertaken. When finally Australia, along with the 14 other member 
nations of the Pacific Islands Forum came together to create the Biketawa Agreement which 
mandated RAMSI, a much greater intervention was required. The R2P advocates long term 
efforts in situations such as the Solomon Islands where political and economic stability is 
extremely vulnerable to outside forces and manipulation by those in power. RAMSI has been 
and continues to be informed by a long term agenda of capacity development, of providing those 
essential blocks that empower a people to further economic growth and political stability within 
a framework of equitable distribution of resources and opportunity. 
Years before RAMSI there were those like interviewee, Ms O‟Callaghan who could see that the 
lack of infrastructure and functioning political system in the Solomon Islands coupled with the 
long standing ethnic tensions and a worsening economic situation would eventually implode. 
There had been several requests made by the Solomon Islands Government prior to Sir Allen 
Kemakeza‟s request to the Howard government in 2003. This one of the many lessons that can 
be learned from RAMSI – when warning signs were as clear as they were during the „Tensions‟ 
in Solomon Islands, prolonging a decision to commit a multinational mission such as RAMSI, 
can mean the difference not only of hundreds of lives lost and tensions further cemented in the 
fabric of a nation like Solomon Islands, but also on the length and size of the intervention 
ultimately required. This includes relative costs assumed by intervening nations. Australia may 
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find itself in a similar situation in the future, especially with ongoing instability in some Pacific 
Island nations, such as Bougainville, PNG. It is only hoped that more concise and expedient 
effort is made before the Solomon Islands threshold is reached, and that our leaders respond to 
requests for assistance before it is too late. 
The Foundations of RAMSI -– Operation ‘helpem fren’ 
There are three distinct pillars that inform RAMSI‟s mandate: law and justice, economic growth, 
and machinery of government. Under these pillars are a number of different goals that have been 
part of the successive stages of the eight years the mission has been in existence, and within 
which capacity development for long term stability and peace is undertaken.  
 Law and Justice 
The law and justice pillar of RAMSI initially involved disarmament, and arrests of the 
perpetrators of the ethnic violence and other crimes against the state. The next phase after this 
was building on the peace. In the stages following this, the departments involved have been 
working to institute a sound, just legal system that pays attention to traditional kastom law, but is 
not defined by it. The work being done with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), in 
partnership with the Participating Police Force (PPF) falls under this pillar and has been one of 
the most successful partnerships. During the Tensions, many of the RSIP (as the force was then 
known) were involved in the violence and corruption. In the first year of mission, more than 200 
of those officers compromised by their actions during the Tensions were purged from the force, 
many of them charged and later convicted of serious crimes.  The RAMSI partnership has helped 
develop a more transparent, accountable and capable security force and walking through the 
streets of Honiara now, you see mostly RSIPF when only a few years ago these would have 
mostly been RAMSI‟s Participating Police Force (PPF) personnel. Permanent Secretary of 
Police, Justice and National Security John Wasi confirmed this fact, and touted the development 
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of the new RSIPF one of the chief successes of RAMSI. The 2010 People‟s Survey reported a 
greater proportion of respondents answered positively regarding the RSIPF, thus indicating the 
improvements in capacity (ANU Enterprises). This trend was consistent with the previous two 
People‟s Surveys conducted. Solomon Islands does not have a military, and thus the island 
nation‟s security will be solely in the hands of the RSIPF. Huge emphasis is placed on their role 
and ability to control all security operations when RAMSI transitions out of the nation. As is 
widely acknowledged, development and security are irrevocably linked, mutually dependent. 
Thus a sound security element is an essential part of the „rebuild‟ pillar of the R2P, and of 
ensuring that states have the capacity to uphold their sovereign responsibilities. An issue in 
regards to law and justice, is how to accommodate and strengthen Solomons‟ traditional kastom 
laws at the same time as not perpetuating practices that may come conflict with international 
human rights particularly in relation to gender and human liberty. The complexity of this task 
can begin to be grasped when it is recognised that Solomon Islands has some 150 different 
systems of law and justice across the nine provinces.  
 Economic Growth 
The economic growth pillar of RAMSI‟s long-term involvement in Solomon Islands has seen 
marked improvements in management of government finances and economic growth, with 
substantial increases in national revenue. The year before RAMSI came, revenue was at $258 
million; by 2006 it was at $700 (Batley, 2006).  Following this revenue growth halted with the 
2006 riots, and the 2008 GFC, yet is now back on track with the Department of Inland breaking 
through the $1 billion revenue collection barrier in 2010. GDP growth of 7% between 2003 and 
2008 was followed by a decrease of 2.2% in 2009 but must also include population growth rate 
which finalises growth of SI GDP as a decline of 1.3% a year since 1998 (World Bank as cited in 
Allen 2011: 7). In attempts to improve this, RAMSI has provided numerous advisors to Solomon 
Islands Government (SIG), establishing an Economic Reform Unit in the Ministry of Finance 
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which has spearheaded key economic reforms (including new or amended supporting legislation) 
of foreign investment processes, State Owned Enterprises and deregulation of 
Telecommunications working in partnership with the Solomon Islands Government and donors. 
Significant problems still exist under this pillar however, with forestry revenues on the decline 
and as yet unfettered nascent mining industry joining destructive cash crops, largely palm oil 
plantations compared with more sustainable agricultural practices that create many more jobs 
and do not cause irreversible damage to the environment. For several years many foreign 
business people have dominated sectors of Solomon Islands economy, using unsavoury and 
inequitable means to do so. Unsavoury business deals and corrupt practices have manifested in 
the current state of Solomon Islands economy where sustainable industries and jobs and business 
opportunities for Solomon Islanders are few and far between. More education and employment 
opportunities for some of the youth bulge over in neighbouring New Zealand and Australia is a 
possible solution to this. Allen (2011: 3) argues the necessity for this Pacific labour mobility – 
preferential access for Solomon Island youth to Australian labour markets in order to give them a 
way of providing for themselves, and so dampen the tinder of the country‟s youth bulge which 
has proven so combustible. Such skills acquired could be transferred back to Solomon Islands 
and create a positive growth cycle, and remittance used to provide living essentials for families 
in an increasingly urbanised environment. One of the outcomes of the 2011 Pacific Islands 
Forum was an increase in the migrant worker program which allows Solomon Islanders to do 
this. 
Plagued by corruption and continually challenged by the country‟s scattered geography and high 
population growth rate - 2.3 % per annum - the economic future of Solomon Islands is one of the 
most challenging aspects of the nation‟s stability, with the forecast 2015 collapse of the logging 
industry expected to cause a fiscal crisis and exacerbate existing socio-economic grievances. The 
issue of land tenure was touched upon by several of the interviewees, including Jane Lake and 
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Sir Peter Kenilorea who commented that in terms of the Solomon Islands economy, it is the most 
problematic element. With no formal legal rights for most traditional, customary land across the 
nine provinces of Solomon Islands is unbounded and this causes many issues. The economic 
situation in Solomon Islands conforms to Tilly‟s analysis of State sovereignty that perpetuates 
„merchant capitalism‟ practices and the control over resources to further the accumulation of 
power (1985). Therefore, this particular pillar of the RAMSI intervention stands on shaky ground 
and may prove to be a factor to undermine state capacity in sovereign responsibility.   
 Machinery of Government 
The third pillar of the RAMSI intervention is the machinery of government. A transparent and 
accountable government framework is central to the functioning of a stable and democratic 
nation. A fluid political system such as that which characterises the Solomon Islands government 
is not one which can effectively manage a nation facing high unemployment rates, continued 
ethnic tensions, constant power struggles and foreign business influences, in themselves a 
corruption influence.  
As noted, before the RAMSI intervention, the machinery of government had all but collapsed. 
As the first Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Sir Peter Kenilorea, noted - „of course the 
situation that caused RAMSI to come to Solomon Islands was such that the most, if not almost 
all, the development institutions and institutions of govt had collapsed as it were. And they have 
been doing great work in that respect now, in strengthening institutions and operation of 
government‟ (9th August 2011). 
One area in which RAMSI has been particularly successful is in the restoration of sound 
financial and macroeconomic management through its work in the Solomon Islands Ministry of 
Finance (Allen, 2011: 7). This may seem questionable considering the state of Solomon Islands 
economy, yet the changes that have been made since the „Tensions‟ period are substantial, and 
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without the transfer of knowledge and  efficient management practices, Solomon Islands would 
be in a far more dire state. In terms of financial assistance, 30% of education expenditure, 50% 
of health, and 90% of development expenditure provided by RAMSI, bilateral and donor 
programs (Allen, 2011: 10).   
RAMSI advisers are located within the Solomon Islands Government systems, not apart from 
them. All RAMSI advisers and in‐line personnel are answerable to their respective Solomon 
Islands supervisors, Permanent Secretaries and Ministers. And it is the Solomon Islands 
Government that has the final say in policy decisions, including government expenditure. For 
instance experienced RAMSI economists have been working with Department of Finance and 
Treasury to develop and implement economic reform to drive economic growth in Solomon 
Islands. Reforms are considered by Cabinet and must also be passed by Solomon Islands 
Parliament. Solomon Islands Minister for Finance and Cabinet have the power to reject reform 
proposals, and have done so on occasion (George, 2007: 4). Authorities maintain that they are 
enhancing, not detraction from or impeding on, sovereignty of the Solomon Islands which is line 
with the R2P framework which seeks to enhance sovereignty, not overpower it. 
Due the inability of the Solomon Islands state to protect its citizens from the widespread ethnic 
violence that was taking place with no end in sight, the R2P was certainly warranted in Solomon 
Islands, and is still valid in terms prevention through building institutions such as described 
above. These preventative efforts all seek to reaffirm sovereignty of the state and ensure that it 
has the capacity to protect its citizens from all manner deprivation to life. RAMSI‟s successes in 
terms of protection lie in its considerable successes in the first stage of the mission, and in its 
maintenance of security over the past 8 years, with the exception of the 2006 riots. The long term 
protection of civilians will be decided by the success of capacity development efforts and the 
reconciliation process. The elements defining RAMSI and Solomon Islands future are discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 - REBUILD and PREVENT: successes and failures of RAMSI  
FOCUSSING ON THE LONG TERM 
Humanitarian intervention under the R2P is legitimised by long term commitment through 
capacity development to prevent the crimes which once occurred, from occurring again. Part of 
this process is the institution of the essential structures needed to provide agency to the 
individual. This process needs to involve several areas that are essential for providing stability 
and security. Most important amongst these are security, economy, and provision of essential 
services such as health and education. Providing the state with the capacity to provide these 
services is an overarching element crucial to the success of all others. Undertaking these tasks is 
essential to the prevention of future atrocities occurring and for the stability of the state, 
functioning in its duty to protect. 
As part of this thesis, interviews were conducted in Solomon Islands with local politicians and 
dignitaries, and RAMSI personnel. This section presents the views and perspectives of these 
people, well informed to comment on the workings of RAMSI in Solomon Islands, the reasons 
why R2P was applicable and the nature of the missions continuing presence. As this thesis seeks 
to show the normative importance of the R2P and to emphasise the need for long term 
commitments to nations like Solomon Islands, the information given by these interviewees is 
invaluable. The Solomon Islands case was one in which the state was unable to protect its 
citizens, and this particular aspect combined with the relative size of Solomon Islands allowed a 
long term intervention committed to underscoring the State‟s sovereignty with the capacity to 
uphold its responsibilities.  
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RAMSI and the R2P 
 „The international community must know, and it does, that good governance and the welfare of 
the people of all nations is a duty that must call for a sense of mission and duty. Those who 
know, those who enjoy, those who have greater choices and opportunities, must help those who 
do not‟  
These are the words of distinguished SI politician Sir Fr. John Ini Lapli, who contributed to the 
ASPI report that motivated a policy change within Canberra that led to RAMSI. This statement‟s 
sentiments have been embodied by RAMSI in its efforts to build capacity in Solomon Islands, 
particularly through the three pillars it focuses on. These pillars are in line with the R2Ps 
mandate of rebuilding and preventing future collapse of institutions. The third pillar of R2P is 
about building the institutions and capacities of a nation to take care of the country and its people 
and provide the opportunities necessary for agency. In other words, to embody the notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility. Second Special Coordinator for RAMSI, James Batley (2006) 
described sovereignty as: 
„...sovereignty is not just about having the ability to pass laws. It‟s also about the capacity of a 
nation to enforce those laws.  Sovereignty is not just the ability to announce government policies. 
It‟s about the capacity of a nation to implement those policies and to pay for them. Sovereignty 
is not just about having local personnel occupying key positions; it‟s ensuring they are effective 
in those positions. Sovereignty is not just about being an independent country, having a flag and 
a national anthem. It‟s about winning the respect and the cooperation of other countries.‟ 
As this paper has emphasised, the R2P works with sovereignty and is an effort to establish the 
responsibilities of States to protect their citizens from grievous harm and circumstance as far as 
they have the capacity to do so. It places primacy on the human being, rather than on the state 
and the sanctity of absolutist sovereignty.  
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Law and Justice, Economic Growth, and Machinery of Government, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, are the three central pillars of RAMSI, the programs involved judged to have prospects 
for success. Beneath these pillars lie a myriad of different issues and themes that run through the 
literature that surrounds the intervention, and the words of those interviewed as part of this 
project. These aspects of RAMSI serve to highlight the successes of the intervention, as well as 
the issue areas and aspects that determine what will need to be done in the future. As such these 
elements highlight the aspects of the mission that RAMSI has had the capacity to deliver, and 
those that it hasn‟t.  
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OR INVASION? 
RAMSI is unique in that it is a police lead, multilateral regional (all members of the PIF 
involved) mission with a military element that is only there to provide security for the police and 
other personnel and to be called upon in emergencies like the 2006 riots. Day and Freeman 
(2005: 141) described this as the new operational model for peacekeeping – policekeeping. They 
argue that this needs to integrate military assistance, rule of law, domestic institutions, and local 
civil society. The operation must integrate a participating police force such as that of RAMSI, 
into local system and employ structural assistance to all aspects of the internal security 
architecture of the developing state. Eventual transfer of authority and operational responsibility 
to local police forces must occur, but in a phased and careful manner (Day & Freeman, 2005: 
141). RAMSI is now moving into the transfer of authority phase, and the opinion of interviewees 
was that the partnership between the PPF and RSIPF has been very successful, and has built the 
capacity to the RSIPF significantly. 
RAMSI does not have the „military‟ air of previous peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that 
have been conducted globally. As Major Alistair Mitchell confirmed – „the primary role of that 
we (the military contingent) have is to support the PPF.....what we do on a day to day basis is to 
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be ready and be on standby for any higher level and higher risk events if they were to occur‟ 
(August 9
th
, 2011). When asked what was the primary reason that troops considered themselves 
in Solomon Islands for, he commented that „from the perspective of the contingent and the 
soldiers it‟s about their support for the Solomon Islands first and foremost and having a stable 
environment here‟ (August 9th, 2011). This would lead the observer to conclude, as far as the 
military contingent goes, that the mission is about humanitarian assistance, not an aggressive 
foreign security agenda. 
Similarly, the term „invasion‟ is synonymous with extracting wealth and resources from the 
intervened nation. Second Special Coordinator for RAMSI James Batley confirmed the contrary 
in his speech to the Honiara Campus of USP in 2006:  
„The idea that Australia or other participating countries are here simply to take advantage of 
Solomon Islands economically, or to dominate the country, is frankly ridiculous. The Australian 
economy is two and a half thousand times larger than the Solomon Islands one. This is not meant 
disrespectfully but to put some perspective into this particular issue. To be honest there are much 
easier ways for Australians to make money.‟ 
A second aspect that confirms the humanitarian nature of RAMSI is the fact that it was invited in 
by the Solomon Islands Government under the leadership of Sir Allen Kemakeza. RAMSI was 
further legitimated by the Facilitation Act that was passed by Solomon‟s National Parliament 
allowing RAMSI to undertake the tasks mandated under the three pillars, within a distinct 
partnership framework. This partnership framework has allowed for many of RAMSI‟s 
successes. As RAMSI Development Coordinator Jane Lake (August 6
th
, 2011) confirmed, 
RAMSI may have started as an intervention but evolved into a true partnership for development. 
Ms Lake identified this as in line with what is called the ACCRA and OECD PARIS declaration 
on aid effectiveness. Essentially the understanding that for development to work effectively it 
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has to be led by the country itself, so any programs a partnership country institutes should be 
with the goal of empowering the people to lead development. 
RAMSI is a long-term intervention, mandated to assist Solomon Islands in the many processes of 
state-building, and to help enable the capacities necessary for the government and people 
effectively direct and distribute the wealth of their nation, and to uphold their responsibility to 
protect. 
 NATIONAL UNITY 
The lack of national unity in Solomon Islands was one of the central issues raised by a majority 
of interviewees and remains a significant challenge in the process of creating lasting peace and 
stability. The Solomon Islands is a group of almost 1000 islands, more than 1000 of them 
inhabited with extensive ethnic and linguistic diversity. The distance that separates the different 
ethnicities, both physically and culturally, has perpetuated a lack of a cohesive and meaningful 
national identity. This has led to situation in which division and separation characterises much of 
the public realm in Solomon Islands. Fraenkel wrote that „allegiance of Solomon Islanders to the 
state was, and remains, less strong than self-identification with separate provinces, islands, 
regions or wantoks‟ (2003: 182). Without a cohesive sense of the whole, what reasons would 
Solomon Islanders have to invest in their country? 
A product of this is the lack of a „social contract‟ between the people and the state, which is an 
agreement that the government will act in the best interests of the people at all times. Benjamin 
(2009: 44) argues that the state exists because of a social and political contract among the 
sovereign people that gives the state its internal legitimacy. Due to Solomon Islands fragmented 
nature, with little sense of national unity, this has been difficult to achieve, and is something that 
RAMSI has had little success inspiring. With a greater sense of a cohesive whole, and a greater 
investment in the nation‟s future, issues like greater government accountability may be pushed 
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by popular support. There is an existing Leadership Code Commission (LCC) in Solomon 
Islands, yet the 2010 People‟s Survey (ANU Enterprises) indicated that 66% of the population 
had never heard of it, and a majority of those who had did not know what it did. Sir Peter 
Kenilorea stated that the nation‟s young people need to be taken out of their comfort zones, their 
insular communities that unwittingly reinforce the fragmentation of the nation. His solution to 
this was a simple, yet potentially extremely effective one – boarding schools (August 9th, 2011). 
The problem with this, as Sir Peter noted, was that it would take a considerable amount of 
resources to achieve, resources that the Solomon Islands simply does not have, and which would 
take a more transparent state system to achieve – one unshackled by the demands of Wantokism.  
 POLITICAL WILL – WANTOKISM? 
A major issue in Solomon Islands is the lack of sound economic leadership by the Solomon 
Islands Government. As discussed in a previous chapter, extractive industries like logging, 
mining and cash crops dominate the economy of Solomon Islands. These industries are owned 
by foreign business people who pay their way through the paperwork to get the permits and land 
necessary to undertake these kinds of economic activities. For example, as interviewee Jane Lake 
(6
th
 August, 2011) commented, the Gold Ridge Mine outside Honiara will provide some 
economic growth for the country, yet it won‟t create many jobs or improve the economic welfare 
of many Solomon Islanders. More sustainable industries like cocoa plantations as opposed to the 
dominant and destructive palm oil plantations or mines would be far more likely improve the 
welfare of a great number of people. Such economic direction and creation of sustainable 
industries are not directed by the Solomon Islands Government, which leads to little sustainable 
economic development. 
Interviewee Ms O‟Callaghan (August 10th, 2011) observed that according to the latest People 
Survey, Solomon Islanders had found the last election (2010) to be the most corrupt they had 
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experienced. This resulted in the election of a government unwilling and unable to make the 
policy changes necessary for a more accountable administration. Traditional wantok practices, 
rather like familial clientelism and preferential treatment, perpetuate corruption and unequal 
distribution of resources. Fraenkel (2003: 10) has noted the pervasive cronyism that runs 
throughout the Solomons political elite, with benefits extending to insiders and wantoks rather 
than redistribution throughout society and pragmatic investment. The functioning of Solomon 
Islands Government through cash handouts can best be exemplified through the „check book 
diplomacy‟ used during the Tensions period, with the manipulation of custom rife throughout 
society – custom remoulded, selectively styled and redefined to meet new circumstances 
(2003:11). This is in line with the argument that Solomon Islands was never truly a functioning 
nation-state, that its democratic systems have never really taken root but been virtually strangled 
from within. Post colonial parliaments expanded the stage for „big men‟ - indigenisation of 
introduced institutions, ministries became intertwined with personal patronage systems (2003: 
185). 
The question that emerges from this is whether the very elements of Solomon Islands that 
generated a need for intervention will be the Achilles heel of the mission and on a broader scale 
the R2P? 
 A CULTURAL DIVIDE? 
Paying attention to local customs and the way in which the society functions, as well as 
integrating local strengths into the programs being carried out in terms of nation building is very 
important to the success of an intervention such as RAMSI. The multinational make up of 
RAMSI ensured that there were participating forces from neighbouring Melanesian and 
Polynesian countries with similar cultural norms. This was important to the process of mission 
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localisation, and acceptance by Solomon Islanders as it effectively diluted what could have been 
perceived as a somewhat „colonial‟ profile.  
A reality of RAMSI however is that the largest contributors to the mission are not the 
neighbouring island nations but Australia and New Zealand. In light of this fact, clashes and 
misunderstandings due to cultural differences would be expected to occur, especially in the 
initial stages of the intervention. Despite a few interviewees indicating that there had been a few 
misunderstandings of this nature, across the board in answer to the question of whether there 
have been many cultural barriers faced between Solomon Islands people and RAMSI personnel 
was that if problems had occurred then it was an issue of personal agenda and particular 
personalities rather than cultural norms differing. As Sir Peter noted there have been „cultural 
misunderstandings sometimes....otherwise there is no deliberate breach of sovereign 
understanding‟ (August 9th, 2011).   
The recently released People‟s Survey 2010 reported that a majority of the Solomon Islands 
population support the presence of RAMSI, and that a majority of people believed that law and 
order had improved or stayed the same in the last year (ANU Enterprises). This is in line with the 
two previous People‟s Surveys conducted in Solomon Islands. However according to Moore 
(2008) RAMSI has experienced significant difficulty in the past in its efforts to coordinate 
projects with the government of the Solomon Islands, especially when Manasseh Sogavare came 
to power (2006 – 2008) off the back of the 2006 riots. Cultural ties often override legal 
stipulations due to the different epistemology in Solomon Islands. The characteristics of the 
Melanesian social structure are the practice of subsistence agriculture; recognition of bonds of 
kinship with important obligations extending beyond the immediate family group to local and 
clan loyalties that far outweigh regional or national affiliations; and a strong attachment to the 
land. Observing these characteristics it becomes clear that if RAMSI is to have any real influence 
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in the political process in Solomon Islands it must consider culturally relative stipulations and 
work within the system – localise intervention. 
The conclusion drawn from this particular reality of Solomon Islands is that for true and lasting 
change to happen in Solomon Islands then it needs to come from within, and that a happy 
medium must be found between the modern and the traditional. This middle ground also needs to 
be stable enough to prevent the manipulation of custom from directing national development.    
 EMPOWERMENT or DEPENDENCY? 
With any foreign involvement in the development of a country, but particularly one as intrusive 
as an intervention such as RAMSI, there is always the danger that that country will become too 
dependent on aid and fail to develop the capacity to stand on its own feet when the interveners 
eventually leave, as RAMSI will one day. Part of the process of rebuilding to stabilise a nation 
and providing the infrastructure necessary to prevent a relapse into the circumstances which 
destabilised the nation, is giving agency to the people, empowering each and every person to 
create their own livelihood, and sustain life. 
This notion of empowerment was most succinctly put by Sir Peter Kenilorea who stated that „let 
us not create this dependency....on what Australia or New Zealand have been outside of Solomon 
Islands...we should be helping ourselves, should be helping them to help us‟ (August 9th, 2011).  
Sir Peter thus acknowledged that while the international community had the responsibility to 
protect Solomon Islands people, the Solomon Islands government holds the responsibility to 
make sure that this is not in vain, and that a situation of dependency is not developed.  
Another significant element of empowerment is progress toward gender equality, an area that 
holds significant development potential, but has a long way to go in Solomon Islands. Programs 
like Muhammad Yunus‟ Grameen Bank which is a microfinance venture that provides loans to 
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women in developing countries has had immense success and highlights the potential of 
investment in women in developing countries. The 2010 People‟s Survey of Solomon Islands 
reported that women were less likely to feel safe in their community; women were mostly 
obtained money through informal employment such as market activity amongst other findings. 
Instituting microfinance programs like that of the Grameen Bank, and pushing for women to 
attain seats in Parliament could potentially bring many positive returns for Solomon Islands in 
the long term. Development Coordinator Jane Lake confirmed this argument, referring to a study 
conducted in India, she stated that „the more women have control of their own lives, and the 
more educated they are, the better you are as a community as a whole‟ (August 6th, 2011). 
Investment in human opportunity, as Ms Lake called it, is essential in terms of prevention. 
Investing in people, in health and education is essential to improving economic welfare, and 
providing the freedoms, the opportunities for people to make choices about the substantive 
direction of one‟s own life. This logic of welfare economics is central to a state‟s responsibilities 
regarding its citizens and the social contract that governs this. The governing body of any 
democratic nation is empowered to provide basic services to its citizens, and to provide the 
economic opportunities for individuals to create livelihoods.  
 LOCALISING INTERVENTION – TRUE PARTNERHIP 
A final element to discuss, as has been mentioned previously, is the vital importance of 
localising intervention. The APCR2P (2009: 8) noted the importance of engaging and integrating 
civilian expertise. The reasons they articulate are fivefold: 1) to provide conflict-sensitive 
development analysis to ensure that development assistance ameliorates rather than inflames 
existing tensions; 2) indigenous mediation capacity to find internal solutions to problems; 3) to 
facilitate inclusive and participatory processes of dialogue about contentious issues; 4) local 
dispute resolution capacity; and 5) the capacity to sustain and grow new capacities.  
62 
 
The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland recently 
conducted a study in Solomon Islands titled „Working with Local Strengths: Supporting States 
and Interveners to Institutionalise the Responsibility to Protect‟ (2010). As the title suggests the 
study focused on understanding how local strengths could be utilised effectively in the peace 
building process, and intern how the intervention could truly be localised and capacity for 
stability ingrained in society through partnership. The authors of the report of the study stated 
that „local actors are at the front line of conflict management, prevention and the provision of 
peace and order so are crucial players in the implementation of R2P, particularly in situations of 
limited state capacity‟ (Brigg & Brown, 2010). 
Localising intervention is an essential element of any R2P intervention such as RAMSI, which 
seeks not only to bring security back to a nation, but to help in the process of capacity 
development so that the atrocities which sparked the intervention in the first place are not 
doomed to repeat. The next stages of RAMSI will be about this transition – handing over more 
power to local bodies and Solomon Islands agencies and slowly decreasing the numbers that 
make up RAMSI. The goal of transition is to create the space for more opportunities for local 
actors to step up and take the lead in ensuring the state upholds its responsibility to protect. 
The current Solomon Islands Government Permanent Secretary responsible for RAMSI, Paul 
Tovua is a perfect example of the importance of and value in engaging local strengths. He has 
been given the task of informing Solomon Islands people, across the entire nation, about what 
will happen next as RAMSI transitions. A former Speaker of the National Parliament, he was co-
chairman of the National Peace Council which laid the foundations for RAMSI with the work 
done across the islands after the 2001 Townsville Peace Agreement. Mr Tovua (August 10
th
, 
2011), indicated that many of the local population are frightened by the prospect of RAMSI 
leaving, as they fear a return to the violence of the Tensions period if RAMSI were to up and 
leave. Yet interestingly, he has noted a generational trend in that many of the youth of Solomon 
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Islands are seeing the necessity and the opportunity in this, just as many of their elders are not. 
Theoretically, working with and drawing upon local strengths is what will enable a nation to 
maintain stability in all areas of national governance and thus the State‟s responsibility to 
protect.    
 
Has RAMSI succeeded? What elements of the mission can inform the progress of the R2P? 
RAMSI been extremely successful in bringing peace and a secure environment to the Solomon 
Islands, and has had significant successes in creating the infrastructure necessary for long term 
stability. The chief motivation for analysing RAMSI in such detail is to extract from this the 
successful elements of the mission that can be transferred to future humanitarian exercises of the 
same nature and to identify mistakes made and opportunities missed, so that these can be 
avoided in the future. Similar analyses of RAMSI have been done in the past by the Asia Pacific 
Centre for the R2P (APCR2P) and McMullen & Peebles (2006). The APCR2P (2009: 4) noted 
the five operational lessons to be learnt from RAMSI as  1) rapid deployment of civilian, military 
and police; 2) definite capacity required to fulfil mandated tasks; 3) different components of 
mission must be closely integrated; 4) capacity development is a crucial but long term 
endeavour; 5) international engagement can provide effective assistance to states. The centre 
further articulated lessons under the umbrella of prevention, arguing that it was not only the best 
form of protection, but the cheaper option as far as monetary costs go (according to the Carnegie 
Commission‟s 1997 report on Preventing Deadly Conflict), and the most effective way to enable 
partnerships that help strengthen states. They also emphasised the importance in utilising civilian 
strengths and in establishing early warning mechanisms.  
In a similar vein, McMullen and Peebles (2006) articulated lessons learnt from RAMSI as 1) 
interventions must be multilateral; 2) they must display overwhelming force so as not to be 
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challenged; 3) interventions must be deep (i.e. committed to rebuilding all elements of State 
function); 4) the intervened society must be ready for intervention; 5) financial resources must be 
secured for intervention before it is conducted. They note that failure to intervene early enough, 
as RAMSI is criticised as doing, can lead to an unnecessary escalation of conflict and costs of 
intervention, as well as arguing that an effective state apparatus, one that is transparent and 
accountable, that gives citizens a stake in their society, in the system, must be constructed. They 
also confirm the necessity of UN sanction in future interventions, and recommend the 
construction of a permanent Pacific Peace & Security Centre, as well as a permanent Pacific 
Peace Monitoring Group which together may allow for prevention of conflict through a regional 
framework that promotes economic development and early warning mechanisms to ensure minor 
disagreements do not become major human rights catastrophes. The crucial challenge they note, 
will be how Australia with its Pacific neighbours can better promote the R2P in the Pacific, 
working with the international community to give effect to it globally (McMullen & Peebles, 
2006: 17). 
In terms of mistakes made, interviewee Mary Louise O‟Callaghan stated that – „most of the 
issues are still there.... to protect is one thing, and to prevent is another. I don‟t think RAMSI has 
done that for a number of reasons. For example land and reconciliation, the concept of how that 
is a problem and what the solution might be are a bit beyond the people who drive RAMSI 
because it is really an issue for the indigenous people of this country......lessons get learnt by 
someone in RAMSI but they take those lessons home and they don‟t get passed on‟ (August 10th, 
2011). 
Whilst the land issue remains one for the government of the Solomon Islands to address, the 
reconciliation process has been greatly aided by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). Corallie Ferguson of Solomon Islands Media Assistance Scheme (SOLMAS) stated that 
– „because of the work we are doing we interface with a lot of RAMSI programs, we can see the 
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work they are doing and the benefits that the Solomon Islands is getting. But sometimes it is two 
steps forward and one step back‟. 
Noting these, there are several other lessons that can be taken from RAMSI to inform the future 
application of R2P. 
LESSONS: 
1) As Allen (2011) noted, one of the most important elements of such a mission as RAMSI 
exemplifies, is to maintain a mindset that enforces the long-term nature of intervention so 
that the people and the processes involved can undertake the tasks necessary in the most 
efficient and appropriate way. This also involves the transfer of knowledge between 
RAMSI personnel regarding the programs and processes of the mission. Continuity of 
purpose and goals needs to be maintained if any significant progress is to be made. 
2) Localising intervention is crucial to the long term success of R2P missions, and helps 
build empowerment and overcome some cultural barriers. As Sir Peter Kenilorea stated, 
Solomon Islands people must not slip into a condition of learned helplessness from 
RAMSIs presence – „we must help them help ourselves‟.  
3) Investment in social capacity and economic opportunity builds stable legs upon which the 
nation can stand, giving the people more stake in the society and its progress which they 
are certainly desiring. With such enabling processes, comes enforcement of elite integrity 
and a state that is willing to uphold its responsibilities. 
4) Policekeeping – After an initial display of force to achieve a secure environment, a police 
led intervention helps dispel the „invasion fear‟ that has plagued other humanitarian 
interventions. 
5) Creative diplomacy – encouraging greater interface and communication across Solomon 
Islands to aid the crucial reconciliation process.  
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As one official noted, RAMSI is part of the furniture in Solomon Islands, and as the transition 
phase is conducted, the enabling architecture will need to remain. One sure conclusion that can 
be made is that RAMSI embodies many of the principles that the R2P advocates. RAMSI 
focuses on capacitating the State and on brining opportunity to the nation‟s population, and is 
committed to long-term, yet not permanent, effort, as the past eight years has shown. RAMSI is 
committed to bringing the conditions necessary for a return to stability, peace and a growing 
economy in Solomon Islands, and has avoided impeding upon sovereignty. By this notion it 
embodies the R2P and is an example of what the international community can do with collective 
action and consensus such as was found at the 2005 UN World Summit. The operational lessons 
learned (long term mindset, continuity of purpose, sufficient resources, clear humanitarian 
mandate, localised partnership framework and enabling social capacity, multinational 
commitment, policekeeping), if transferred can inform cases of similar size and scale and give 
weight to the doctrine through successes. With the momentum that can build with such cases, the 
doctrine may be able to provide a mechanism for answering 21
st
 century conflict cycles. The 
establishment of the R2P as a decisive norm through this process may lead into a new era of 
greater international consensus on state responsibilities to protect the human rights of citizens 
across the globe.    
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CONCLUSION 
‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’ (A3, UDHR) 
This paper has attempted to analyse the Responsibility to Protect and whether the doctrine has a 
future in the workings of the international system as an effective mechanism for conflict 
resolution and for consensus on issues that surround violations of life, liberty and security of 
person. Through the lens of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, the issue areas 
as well as the positive functioning of the R2P in action has been analysed and discussed.  
Many issues still exist in relation to the application of the R2P. Firstly, it is an attack on the 
absolute nature of sovereignty, instead shifting focus to fundamental human rights and the 
responsibility of states to ensure they are protected. Secondly, the international community has 
so far shown inconsistent application of the concept, with questions to its viable operationality in 
the varying conflict contexts across the globe. Thirdly, the issue of international authority 
remains in discussions of whether the R2P can become a legitimate source of customary law and 
normative instruction. Finally, there remains a potential for abuse of the doctrine by states with 
unsavoury motivations for intervention. 
Despite these issues, all of which are founded and deserve attention, the R2P holds significant 
potential and there can be optimism for the future of the doctrine. Part of this optimism comes 
from successful contemporary humanitarian interventions like RAMSI, which has been shown to 
embody the principles of the R2P in its conduction and various programs. Most significantly, 
RAMSI shows a commitment to prevention in its long-term nature and focus on capacity 
development and partnership. This is what has truly defined RAMSI as an intervention, an 
assistance mission rather than invasion such as the recent decade has seen in Iraq. RAMSI is not 
without its issues, as interviewees noted some of the underlying causes of the „Tensions‟ are still 
to be addressed, and could again rise to the surface. Corruption is still endemic and the economic 
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direction uncertain. Yet these must not detract from the important changes the mission has 
instituted, and the protection and provision of fundamental human rights that the mission has 
facilitated. RAMSI has shown that a police led intervention that is defined by true, stable, 
sustained partnership with local authorities and integration into local systems of government can 
produce significant results. In other words, localisation of intervention allows for more effective 
and efficient processes for the delivery of humanitarian aid and for building the blocks of a 
nation that provide the stability, security, and opportunity that a developing country needs. There 
is much work still to be done, but these lessons must be learned and transferred to future 
instances where an R2P mission such as RAMSI will be needed. 
RAMSI is relatively small scale case, and one in which the government was unable to protect its 
citizens. Moving from small cases such as this to cases in which the powerful, abusive and 
unwilling state is will demand an R2P that holds greater normative standing and operational 
capacity. With the more successful the cases, the more likely the norm is to be established, 
expectations to develop and the society of states to feel compelled to respond. 
Humanitarian Intervention remains an unwelcome necessity, as Benjamin (2009) notes, with the 
failure of states to abide by their sovereign responsibilities to protect their citizens, and with 
power struggles at both the domestic and international level.  It is a reality that many of the other 
nations that need humanitarian assistance in such a form as RAMSI has given, have more 
complex issues surrounding them and the political expediency of an intervention is extremely 
difficult. Are the successes of missions like RAMSI enough? Enough to shift the foreign policy 
of states toward involvement in humanitarian assistance in line with the principles of the R2P, 
when violations of human rights are occurring? Will the international community and individual 
states commit to long term assistance which is necessary for capacity development and the 
prevention of future atrocities and sustained civil unrest? Peace is a choice that must carry 
69 
 
greater incentives than war, and the international community has the responsibility to ensure that 
this is a reality.  
The conclusion of this study and analysis of the ways in which the RAMSI embodies the 
principles of the R2P, is that despite the many issues that still surround global conflict resolution 
and complex peacekeeping efforts, successful undertaking of humanitarian intervention can 
occur and the R2P can progress as a norm in the international system and as an impartial 
mechanism for conflict resolution, building a culture of prevention. There are many elements 
that have contributed to the successes that RAMSI has had, and its failures can be recognised and 
lessons drawn for the progression of R2P and its application beyond the Pacific Islands. It is 
certainly acknowledged that geopolitical, social, and cultural specificities of different conflict 
areas present very different challenges for the application of R2P and its consistency, as well as 
considerable issues of international political will and consensus, yet the outlook remains positive 
from this author‟s point of view. The successes of RAMSI can be transferred to other contexts in 
the future, and primacy can be put on the protection of each individual‟s right to life, liberty and 
security of person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX 1: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Relevant Articles 
Article 2 - Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction 
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty.  
Article 8 - Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 13 (1) - Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders 
of each state. 
Article 17 (1) - No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their property  
 Civilian homes, land, possessions are often destroyed in missile fire, or burnt down by 
rebel groups in situations of civil conflicts that necessitate international humanitarian 
assistance. In Solomon Islands, many homes were burnt down when the waring Malaitan 
and Guale rebel militia (MEF & IFM) were at the height of the conflict.  
Article 22 - Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality 
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 Human security and provision of essential economic freedoms and opportunities are 
crucial to sound, stable and sustainable development of any nation. 
Article 25 (1) - Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
 Transparent, accountable and capable governing officials and structures are tasked with 
the provision of such services, essential to sustaining life and improving wellbeing of 
citizens 
Article 26 (1) - Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
 Education provides agency and drives awareness. It gives people the capacity to 
contribute to the development of a modern economy, and to question unsound 
government practices 
Article 28 - Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
 The international community has the responsibility to act in a timely and decisive manner 
to assist states in their responsibilities to protect the life, liberty and security of person, of 
each individual 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Speech by Current RAMSI Special Coordinator Nicholas Coppel 
Building the Capacity to Protect: The work of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands 
Nicholas Coppel, Special Coordinator,  
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands  
Wednesday, 22 June 2011 
 
Eleven years ago this month, (on June 5, 2000) armed gunmen - consisting of both police 
officers and civilian militants - took over the streets of this capital, forcing a democratically 
elected Government from office, affectively „collapsing‟ the rule of law and with it the capacity 
of the sovereign state of Solomon Islands to protect its citizens.  
Most of you here today know, and indeed many of you lived through, what happened from this 
point on. Even after parliament had „elected‟ a new national government, without a functioning 
police force to enforce the rule of law, the capacity of the state to protect or even provide for its 
citizens, continued to erode as increasing lawlessness led the country to near economic collapse.  
In 2003, at the request of the then Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Sir Allen Kemakeza, 
Australia agreed to fund and form with all other member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, a 
Regional Assistance Mission to work with Solomon Islands people, its governments and 
institutions to help rebuild the capacity of this state to protect and provide for its citizens.  
RAMSI, as it is now known, is made up of two important partnerships which define both the 
shape and the overarching goal of the mission. The first of these is the partnership of the Forum 
states, which as the contributing countries provide the personnel that make this a truly regional 
mission. It is through this regional partnership, that RAMSI can be seen to be fulfilling the 
commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting their obligation to protect, 
in this case the citizens of Solomon Islands. 
The second and equally important partnership that defines us is our partnership with Solomon 
Islands.  RAMSI has always been predicated on the assumption that working together, the 
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mission could and should assist the Solomon Islands to rebuild its capacity to protect and provide 
for its citizens.  
I was pleased to see that the full title of the project that has produced the framework being 
launched today is “Working with local strengths: supporting states to build (the) capacity to 
protect” for that, in a nutshell, sums up the overarching goal of RAMSI, to work with the people, 
governments and institutions of Solomon Islands to help create a space safe enough that 
Solomon Islanders could re-engage more effectively in the business of state building than was 
possible during the period of conflict here known as The Tensions. 
The research that has been done as part of this project in Solomon Islands is valuable and much 
of what has been set out in the framework of engagement reflects RAMSI‟s own experience over 
the past eight years of working in partnership with the Solomon Islands.  
RAMSI is a unique initiative, never before attempted by the countries of our region or elsewhere 
for that matter.  The mission‟s commitment to assist Solomon Islands goes well beyond simply 
creating a stable environment and strengthening the capacity of the security sector, to a much 
broader commitment to assist Solomon Islanders in their efforts to strengthen the functions of the 
state in areas such as economic management and good governance.  This was an ambitious but 
very deliberate decision, reflecting the unanimous views of the Pacific Island Forum Leaders that 
the mission should assist Solomon Islanders to address the fundamental causes of their nation‟s 
near collapse and not just be a „quick-fix‟ focused on security. 
This was new territory for all involved and has of course been a learning experience for all, 
Solomon Islands and contributing countries alike. I am sure my predecessors, RAMSI‟s four 
previous Special Coordinators would agree, that we have learnt as much, if not more, from our 
failures and omissions as we have from our successes. What I do know is that we have always 
worked hard to try to ensure that the mission is transparent and accountable both at the national 
and at the village level.  
RAMSI has always recognised that in addition to the government, the police and other state 
institutions, local actors such as women leaders, youth leaders, churches, chiefs and their 
communities, non-government organisations and the media are important partners in the process 
of rebuilding the capacity of the state to protect its citizens. Identifying and drawing on the 
strengths of these local actors has been an important part of how the mission has sought to give 
meaning to its work in Solomon Islands.  
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In the first year of RAMSI, when the mission was new and its make-up and mandate not widely 
known or understood, the then Special Coordinator, Nick Warner, and Commander of the 
Participating Police Force, Ben McDevitt, personally devoted a large amount of their time to 
travelling throughout the country‟s nine provinces in order to consult face-to-face with the 
communities and their leaders whom they were seeking to partner in building peace.   
But probably one of the best and earliest examples of the mission‟s recognition of the value of 
working with local actors and building on their strengths can be seen in the very close 
partnership that RAMSI enjoyed with the National Peace Council from the outset of RAMSI 
deployment on 24 July 2003. With its strong local leadership, headed by its chair, the highly 
respected national leader, Paul Tovua and its network of peace monitors in every province, the 
National Peace Council, proved to be the perfect local partner for RAMSI‟s Participating Police 
Force, in their drive to rid the country of the guns that had so undermined the nation‟s stability. 
Importantly and quite uniquely for those times, the National Peace Council had established 
credibility locally as a neutral body that was above the ethnic, criminal and other rivalry and 
divisions that had fractured the country‟s politics and peace. In return the Participating Police 
Force, backed by RAMSI‟s military contingent, provided the very real security and protection 
required if the National Peace Council was going to be able to do their work safely. This 
combination of the protection afforded by an international force combined with the local 
networks and local knowledge of a neutral and credible local body proved to be a hugely 
successful formula resulting in the collection and destruction of more than 4000 high powered 
weapons and firearms in the first year of the Solomon Islands-RAMSI partnership.    
Now, seven years later, this partnership has moved to the point where together we are planning 
for Solomon Islands to more fully reassume primary responsibility for providing for and 
protecting its citizens. As part of this process, we have been holding intensive consultations with 
groups of key local actors such as women leaders, chiefs, church leaders and youth. Known as 
Wakabaot Toktoks, these consultations have sought to explore the issues, the possible 
complications and the opportunities that the transition of the Solomon Island-RAMSI partnership 
may create for local actors and their communities.        
For in order to assist in building the capacity of our Solomon Islands partners, we have also had 
to inform and educate ourselves not only about their strengths but also about the challenges 
involved. It has been our experience, for instance, that the traditional mechanisms for peace 
building and conflict resolution are not so widely known nor understood by many in the 
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country‟s diverse communities. So while many speak about a desire to incorporate and meld 
traditional systems into those inherited more recently at Independence, there is a gap between 
this desire and the knowledge of how this might be achieved. To this end, RAMSI is supporting 
the World Bank‟s Justice for the Poor program which is working with the Ministry of Justice 
and Legal Affairs investigating and mapping the different types of traditional justice systems in 
use across Solomon Islands. It is only when we have a clear understanding of what is culturally 
in place that donors and government will be able to sensitively and productively engage with 
these traditional justice systems.     
Having said this, RAMSI‟s own recent experience has shown the value of drawing on traditional 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts, even if the community needs to be led through a renewed 
knowledge of these traditions by their own leaders. Last year following the very first fatality of a 
Solomon Islander in the history of RAMSI‟s deployment, which occurred during a joint RSIPF-
RAMSI operation, we sought immediately the advice of the deceased‟s community on the most 
culturally appropriate way to express both our regret and sympathy. In this we were very 
fortunate to have at our disposal both the Assistant Special Coordinator, Masi Lomaloma, a 
highly experienced and respected Fijian public servant who has now served with RAMSI for the 
past five years as well as Solomon Islands Permanent Secretary responsible for RAMSI Affairs, 
Paul Tovua, an equally experienced and respected senior Solomon Islands leader that I referred 
to earlier. Together these two men were able to seek out from those leaders in the grieving 
community, the relevant traditional knowledge to guide our interactions, to ensure that we drew 
on the most culturally appropriate mechanism for moving forward without conflict. I believe 
Masi will discuss in more detail how this was achieved during this afternoon‟s discussion.         
Another example pertinent to the need to recognise both local strengths and weaknesses can be 
found in the work we have been doing and continue to do with the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force (RSIPF). In recent years this work has focused on building both the capacity of individual 
officers as well as the institution itself. Soon RAMSI will begin withdrawing personnel from the 
some of the 13 provincial police posts that we are currently supporting throughout the country. 
This is largely as a result of the much improved capacity of the local police but it is also, in part, 
recognition that while RAMSI‟s role was to help create a safe space. After nearly a decade, it is 
also time to make sure that we do not continue to occupy too much of that space ourselves.       
Recognition that there are actors within local communities with the strength to occupy some of 
this space, particularly in the area of maintaining public order, is partly what has informed 
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RAMSI‟s strong support for the RSIPF‟s pilot Community Officer program which assists 
communities to nominate their own representatives or community officers to deal with petty 
crime and social disorder at the village level and act as liaison point for the police. This project 
which builds on an earlier concept of area constables that worked effectively in the decade 
following independence, has been embraced enthusiastically by many communities and 
hopefully will be able to be expanded further. It is but one example of where a local strength has 
been identified to assist in addressing a weakness in the state‟s capacity to carry out more 
conventional modes of policing, and in particular the economic reality that the RSIPF cannot be 
expected to maintain a permanent presence in all of the hundreds of islands that make up this 
nation. I believe there are others here today who will talk later about this in more detail.  
Finally, if I could commend the efforts both of the researchers and the local participants that 
have contributed to this important research, in bringing together the international dialogue on the 
Responsibility to Protect to Solomon Islands door. We have eight years of first-hand experience 
to share about this unique attempt by the countries of the region to Helpem Fren. I look forward 
to today‟s discussions and the insight they might provide not only for those of us in RAMSI but 
also those in Solomon Islands and in the international community who are now going to be 
building on the work we have done thus far. 
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APPENDIX 3: 
Programs External to RAMSI 
1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that was launched in 2009 by Bishop 
Desmond Tutu. The commission draws upon, although is not exclusively modelled on, 
the South African TRC. Its process involves taking statements, holding public hearings in 
which both victims and perpetrators tell their stories, exhumations and investigating 
statements in an effort to bring dignity back to the victims, and heal the wounds left from 
the conflict without causing more tension. The TRC focuses on examination of human 
rights violations and writing a history of what happened during the Tensions. 
2. The communications for development program that is run by the Solomon Islands Media 
Assistance Scheme (SOLMAS) is one amongst several programs that seek to integrate 
the isolated communities across the some 100 inhabited islands that make up the country, 
as the Peace Council did during the 2001-2003 period. Communications for Development 
aims to assist NGOs to bring awareness to the remote areas with no access to other 
methods of communication. It is hoped that through this program, the transfer of 
information that it facilitates, will bring behaviour change so that citizens are aware of 
such health issues and how they are contracted. 
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APPENDIX 4: 
 
Strategies for Structural Prevention (Mayerson, 2010: 18) 
 
 Democracy as a Protective Factor, Supporting Nations Transitioning to Democracy  
 Economic Growth and Economic Stability  
 Development Assistance  
 Good Governance  
 Strengthening legal protections and judicial systems  
 Security Sector Reform  
 Fighting Corruption  
 Promoting Civil Society and Civil Institutions  
 Educating for Tolerance  
 Programs to Combat the Political Manipulation of Ethnic Tensions  
 Promotion of Human Rights  
 Develop the Capacity of the United Nations to respond to potential R2P Crimes  
 Develop the Capacity of Regional Organisations to contribute to prevention  
 Deterrence as a Form of Prevention  
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